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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
Judgment o{ conviction in this matter was entered on the 3rd day of October, 
1994. This appeal is taken from a final judgment pursuant to the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and specifically pursuant to Rule 26 if'b)( 1) of said Rules. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
L Is the statute under which the appellant is charged, Utah Code Annotated, § 76-6-
505, 1,1953 as amended), unconstitutionally vague on its tace and as applied to the 
facts of this case. 
II. Is fraudulent intern required as an element in tins type of crime for a crime to 
exist? 
IIL Where, in a criminal proceeding where the State of Uiah is the party plaintiff rnay 
criminal liability and punishments be predicated upon a third puny s unfetteied 
discretion? 
IV. Does Utah Code- Annotated § 76-6-505 as drawn permit imprisonment for a debt 
which is in contravention oi the provisions under Article L § 16 of the Utah 
Constitution? 
V. Does Utah Code Annotated §76-6-505 as drawn shift the burden of persuasion 
from Plaintiff to Defendant? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was originally charged by Information with Issuing Bad Checks, a 
2nd Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-535 (1953 as amended"), 
and Communications Fraud, a 3rd Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-10-1906 (1). Through negotiations between attorneys involved in this case, the 
Appellant agreed to plead guilty to the amended charge of issuing Bad Checks, a 3rd 
Degree Felony. The Communications Fraud was to be dismissed thirty days after 
sentencing. Defendant was sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison for a term not 
to exceed five years but the sentence was suspended and Appellant was placed on 
probation. The remaining two counts were dismissed. 
Pursuant to proceeding had on 11 August, 1994, the Defendant entered a plea of 
guilty but preserved issues for appeal as presented in Pretrial Motions (T. page 2). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellant is charged with violation of certain provisions of the Utah Criminal 
Law; laws winch are vague on their face and as they are applied to the facts of 
tins case,, 
2. The vagueness of applicable Utah law allow a third party to decide, in their 
unfettered discretion, winch offender may be held civilly liable and winch offender 
may be held criminally liable. This third party discretion violates the Equal 
Protection Law and the Due Process guaranteed to us all. 
3. Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-535, as drawn, permits imprisonment for a debt 
which is in contravention of the provision under Article I, § 16 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
4. Appellant was denied any defense based on lack of intent to defraud a 
prerequisite to the maintenance of any criminal prosecution of this nature, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L The statute under which appellant is charged, Utah Code .Annotated, § 76-
6-535, ("1953 as amended), is unconstitutionally vague on its face. 
The United States Supreme Court in Koiender v, Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n. 8, 
75L.Ed.2d 903, 910 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983) observed: 
In his dissent, Justice \Vhite claims the !,[t'|he upshot of our cases . . . is that 
•whether or not a statute purports to regulate constitutionally protected conduct, it 
shoyuld not be held unconstitutionally vague on its face, unless it is vague in all of 
its possible applications." Post at 370, 75 L.Ed.2d at 917-918. The description of 
our holdings is inaccurate in several respects. First, it neglects the fact that we 
permit a facial challenge if a law reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct." Hoffman Estates v. Flippside, Hoffman Estates, Lie,, 455 
U.S. 489, 494, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 102 S.Ct 1186 (1902). Second, where a statute 
imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher. See, Winters v. 
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 92 L.Ed. 840, 68 S.CL 665^1948). This concern 
has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could 
conceivably have had some valid application. See, e.g. Coiauiii v. Franklin, 439 
U.S. 379, 394-401, 58 L.Ed.2d 556, 99 S.Ct. 675 \ 1979); Lanzelta v. New Jersey, 
300 U.S. 451, 85 LEd. 888, 59 S.Ct. 618 U939'). 
The United States Supreme 'Court stated the void-for-vagueness doctrine in 
Koiender, Id. at 357-358 as follows: 
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute 
define the criminal oflense with stiffieient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important 
aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal 
element of the doctrine— the requirement that a legislature establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement." Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574, 
39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242. Where the legislature fails to provide such 
minimal guidelines, a criminal statue may permit "a standardless sweep [that] 
allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their own personal 
predilections.11 id. at 575, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.CL 1242. 
A statute similar to Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-535, (1953 as amended) was 
declared unconstitutionally vague on its face by the Colorado Supreme Court in People 
v. Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405, 494 F.2d 826 i*Colo. 1972) at 830, the Court observed: 
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We hold the definition of "insufficient funds" in Section 40-14-20 (l)(h) is vague, 
ambiguous, and unintelligible. That section defines insufficient funds to mean 
"that the drawer has no legal right to require the drawee to pay the check in 
accordance with the ordinary course of the banking business." An interesting 
contrast to this definition is that contained in the amended version of the vetoed 
1969 HJ3. 10S7 which defined "insufficient funds" as follows: 
"A drawer lias insufficient funds with a drawee to cover a check when he has no 
funds or account whatsoever, or funds in an amount less than that of the check; 
.and a check dishonored for ''no account" shall also be deemed to have been 
dishonored for "insufficient funds". 
The above quoted definition spelled out an understandable meaning of 
"insufficient funds" while the 1970 Act leaves the meaning to surmise and 
conjecture. Criminal liability cannot be predicated on such a standard. \Vhat is 
meant by "legal right?" Does it refer to legal rights as determined by the 
provisions of Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, CR.S. 1963, 155-4-101 
et seq?; or does it mean contractual rights between the drawer and the drawee; 
or, does it refer to legal rights created by the provisions of the criminal law? 
Also, where does one look to determine what accords with "the ordinary course of 
banking business?" Is it to the Uniform Commercial Code, to some other statute, 
or to the customs and practices of the banking business itself? Tins failure of 
definition to clearly delineate an understandable meaning to the term "insufficient 
funds," renders this portion of the statute invalid as being vague, indefinite, 
ambiguous, and unintelligible. 
Next, we find that the lack of any requirement in Section 40-14-20' that there be-
an intent to defraud coupled with a presumption of guilt provided in Subdivision 
(5)(a)('i) would, under certain circumstances, render Section 40-14-20 to be no 
more than a device to force payment of a debt. It is quite more than a device to 
force payment of a debt. It is quite conceivable that a person could issue a check 
without "knowing or having reasonable cause to know" that it will not be paid 
when presented as required in Subdivision (2)(b). Thereafter, if the check is for 
some reason not paid when presented, and if the maker is unable to redeem his 
check within fifteen days (see Subdivision (6)(b), a presiunption arises winch shifts 
the burden on the defendant to disprove his guilt. Such a result strikes at the 
very foundation of our system of criminal justice as was recognized by this Court 
in Moore v. People, supra. It is elementary that the burden of proving every 
element of a criminal charge is upon the prosecution. Under Section 40-14-20, 
the People need only to introduce the check, shew it was not paid, and rest. The 
defendant is then placed in a position of being required to prove his innocence in 
order to avoid imprisonment not for a criminal act, but for debt. Tliis is because 
without fraudulent intent as an element in this type of offense, there can be no 
crime. In this respect, Section 4014-20 can be inteipreted as notiiing more than a 
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collection statute which authorizes imprisonment for debt. As such, it is in 
contravention of Colo. Const. Art. II, 12. 
See also, Burnam v. Commonwealth. 228 Ky. 410, 15 S.W.2d 255, which uses the 
following language to describe a statute winch was, in some respects, similar in 
content to Section 40-14-20: The act ... is a debt collecting law. To that end, it 
undertakes to invoke criminal processes and to inflict penalties which in their 
severity may be on occasion disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense 
endeavored to be created and the evil sought to be cured. The essential and 
controlling difference between the act and other statutes of this kind ... is that the 
element of feud and other criminal purpose is not an ingredient." 
The Appellant is charged by Information in this case for violating the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated, § 76-6-505, (1953 as amended) which provides: 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
service, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee 
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft 
For the purpose of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for which 
payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would 
not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any1 money, properly, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is legally 
refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if lie fails to make 
good and actual payment to payee in the amount of the refused check or draft 
within 14 days of Ins receiving actual notice of the check or draffs; nonpayment. 
Defendant contends that the provisions of §76-6-505 (supra) lack any clear 
definite standards to determine guilt under the statute or guidelines as required to 
govern law enforcement Section 76-6-535 tails to give any clear definition to the term 
"payment of which check or draft is legally refused by the drawee". "Legally refused" is a 
legal term of art, subject to various interpretations and the question must then arise; 
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does it refer to legal rights as determined under the provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code; does it mean contractual rights uetwem -n. • *- ' * • . * • • 
bank; does it refer to legal rights created by the ppivi NOILS oj UK* criminal law: u"X-> :i 
reiVr '. -.. —.r . . . . . . ., . ^ > 
the ruies laid down v\ mr bederai Reserve hoardV 
^^ i .'^aji v^ _HjLH?e^  * --• ' - : ' ^' -V- : '-"'.•« l n ' • v fondant was convicted 
of disuideriy a m a i n and nt appealed. The Cuun of Appeals, Jackson, J., i lekl that 
disorderly conduc siaiuU' nivsennirn; ^b^vne or ubusive hmgiu^e spok'T .vi-, T i,jr " > 
cause public ineunvunit-noi-, annoYo " . • * ! , ^ • >• - i" \ • , 
A is Ljfi'''Mi^ 'jUiLio'Miiv A'L'fbinau. j'he uecisio'i ^ i> T V U ^ ' I ! , r \\v instant case, the 
* . • .,- ^ "ho statute fails to 
clearly state wi e .us : i\ R fu>ou oy eni^ee" iiiean^ m uiui uiv. bank may be bound to 
pay or dishoi lor the instrument with respect to certain fact situations while whether or 
not to dishonor the instrument may be discretionary ii 1 other instances. This lack of 
definition encouraged arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by placing unlettered 
discretion in me IUJ. :• -:' f -. A<.. ^ -^ - > 
whether to supply one >.u the element OJ" liie ohonse o^ontiai ioi piesreuuon. 
Seetioi i 76-6- Si 15 fur ii ler lacks ai ly i equii en lei it that ti le pi osea ilion establish and 
prove beyond a i easonahle doubt, that the Appellant had any intent to defraud as being 
aj i. eien lent necessary for a criminal conviction under* the statute. The Federal (."juris 
have held that Due Process requires that criminal intent be an essential element of a 
crime, Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Sup p. 968 (D.G 111. 1968). It is quite conceivable that a 
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person could issue a check without ,!knowing or having reasonable cause to knew" thai it 
will not be paid when presented as required under Subsection i, 1). See, People v. 
Vinnola, supra, cf State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, (Utah 1983). Assume the case 
where Defendant made a deposit via the night depository but the deposit was, for 
whatever reason; not attributable to Defendant's conduct, never recieved by the bank. 
Does the bank have any legal obligation to pay? Does the bank have any legal 
obligation to pay within ten days in order to absolve Defendant of criminal conduct? 
Does civil resolution of the competing claims not depend on factual nuances of the civil 
law? Can the payee* in the mean time, insist on payment of a check wiiieh was 
consequently dishonored at the banks discretion 
The Nebraska Supreme Co ml held thai the eliniinutiuii of criminal intent as 
element oi piouf necessary to establish violation of statute may violate Due riocess 
when the penalty foj violation of the statute is t-eveje oi conviction pursuant to said 
statute may irreparably damage the Defendant's reputation State v. Pettit, 445 N.W.2d 
890 (Neb. 1989). The disabilities occasioned by a felony conviction might well satisfy 
that standard 
Defendant submits that the provisions of §76-6-505 (supra) should not be 
construed to be a strict liability statute because the statute does not clearly indicate a 
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of conduct 
prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of a culpable mental state to defraud. 
State v. El tog 680 P.2d 727 ('Utah 1984"); Morissette v. United States, 342 U S . 246, 96 
L.Ed. 288, 72 S.Ct. 240(1952). 
/ 
In Colautti v. Franklin, 99 S.Ct supra at P 675 n.9, it is stated that 
"Constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whet he i ti iat stai idai < 1 
incorporates the requiremei it of mens rea11. 
T ' * ' ' ' ' > ! ' ' ° l ! ' J M . I H . . V . I -JUL, ; ' • , ' ' * • . l-. ' ld 
dial a pu'ijie .-MIKXI I'uyiu ir*« i-e puuisheu for an act committed innocently wit! lout 
ci "• i ie statute, with no reference to mental state, made private 
appropriation of public money a felony. 
In the instant case:, the r^vemment failed to allege any criminal intent to defraud 
and none was S'*- ^ , . • • • • , . . • .. 
criminally? 
The vanous : i \>'>\^\)> o- 1 a.:1; • ouc Annotated §76-6-535 (supra) encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because the statute: places I a :i fetl ei e < i < 1 is ;retioi l 
and ODiitrol in the hands of a third person, (wiiether the drawee' hank or the holder of ' 
m* c"> i ^ • ^ ii b. pi«,^ccuicd under the 
siatuie ana wmen person is a customer s^ vuuieu in ^ ns "indiscretion" should be 
• v -' >iativf n» *,-• i' • i • uie Process and Equal Protection 
of the Laws. 
nc provisions oi § .-\.-u-505 ('supra) are unconstitutionally vague, there 
being a lack of ai lyuuii'-^ % . • =. •. M.>I-. * *-. ,
 : uK<e 
law enforcement. The provisions of §76-6-535 utterly fails to, in terms of principals of 
criminal law, adequately define the term "legally refused by the drawee". The; statute 
further eschews any requirement that the pi oseci ition « ^ stablisl i ai id pi ove beyond a 
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reasonable doubt the necessary mens re a to establish intent to defraud and thus obtain a 
criminal convietioa Utah Code Annotated §76-6-535, on account of such deficiencies 
coupled with the presumptions of guilt created by the statute, may be utilized as nothing 
more than a collection statute wliich authorizes imprisonment for debt, said practices 
being strictly forbidden by the clear meaning of Article I, Section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
That Section 76-6-505 authorizes imprisonment for debt and becomes even more 
apparent upon comparing Section 76-6-505 to the civil liability provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated § 7-15-1, (1953 as amended). The necessary elements to establish civil 
liability for issuing a bad check under Section UCA 7-15-1 are identical to the elements 
necessary to establish criminal liability for issuing a bad check under Section 76-6-505 
The Colorado Supreme Court in People v, Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405, 494 P.2d 826 
(Colo. 1972) at 830, the Quirt observed: 
The trial court found the statute unconstitutional and void because of 
vagueness, uncertainty, indefmiteness, ambiguity, and unintelligibility. It 
also found that, in some instances, it is selective in prosecution; that the 
bank involved has the power to decide whether a party is a criminal or a 
favored customer; and finally, that the statute is a eolleeLion statute and 
imposes imprisonment for debt. 
The Utah Supreme Court has construed Section 7-15-1 "to require that the 
signatory of a bad check personally receive benefits, seivices, or money transfer or, in the 
alternative, hive actual knowledge that the check is drawn on insufficient funds in order 
to be held liable." Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v, Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 
467 (Utah App. 1989). In Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. it is sucsinctly 
put that to do otherwise would bring the result that "more stringent and onerous burden 
9 
[would be] thereby imposed on the Plaintiff's counsel than that imposed on his 
counterpart the prosecutor/1 This interpretational ine- '^ -i- • -
anomalous result of a person, being imprisoned for a uc»n h^ uiu noi owi . >et* aiso, 
iVturson 1 jurnrijig>uppiy: v. Ltnisou "* *" " "'• • .). 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505 should be declared facially 
invalid 011 the reasoning that the statute has no nracti?a: application \i: any cast- becai.se 
of vagueness and is constitutional • ' :. *..-.- • " \r \ •• -, 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505 should be declared unconstitutionally 
vague as applied n l the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the statute undei which she is charged, 
u i • •• \ • ^ ., . . j- • ' M J S M L U O . U : y i i i ' i r m 
' " 'he ground Ihr !l t. ncouiages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by placing 
niiieLLerfj discretion in the hands and control of a third party to determine when guilt 
attaches and as to winch person will be prosecuted under the slaluie, Adiiim maliy. I he 
statute, because of the absence of the necessary el en lent v( intern to defraud JS a 
collection statute which aulhori/r imprisonm* an i">i a «h • I»i in o »nli avei ilioi i I'" ihe 
provisions under Article L §16 of the I Ttah GonstiU ilk n L The statute should therefore 
10 
be declared unconstitutional by tins Court and the Information charging the Appellant 
with violating Section 76-6-505 should have been dismissed by the trial court.. 
Respectfully submitted this / i/)^ day of N.&M _> IS195. 
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(b) persons < h n gc d with 1 f* lon\ wluU on pi 
badon o! pirob or v\bib bee on hail uv siting 
til i lon i pre v IOUS folonv charge when then is 
substantial evidence to suppoit the new folonv 
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ignated bv statute \s OIK tor wbuh bill rniy be 
denied if there is substantial evidence to suppoit 
the ch \rge and the court finds b\ clear nnd con 
vinnng evidence thi t the poison would const 1 
tute a substantial dinger to \n\ othc r person ot 
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ishmeii ts J 
Excessive bail shall not be required excessive fines 
shall not be imposed nor shall citiel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted Persons ,u rested or linpi i 
oned sh ill not b< tie tie d w itb urine ( ess ir\ ? igoi IH'H 
S u HI ! I I I H I In Hit \ I 
In capit d cases the light of trial bv puv sh \\\ t« 
in uri mviolite In courts of general jurisdiction *^ 
ccpt in capital cTses a |urv '-hall consist of eight pi 
tors In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jurv shall ion 
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shall be administered vvitboul dein il oi unnecessuy 
delav and no person sinII bf b u red from prosecuting 
or defending before anv t n h u m l in this St He b\ 
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Sec II | l*i <<<utiouh\ mini million oi unlit i 
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right of the people to hi scum in (hi i per-
nns houses papers and effects ag nnst unre i m l lr 
searches and sei7inos shall not be violated and no 
\\ in urt sh ill ismic but upon probable cause sup 
polled bv o i tbor dlirmition parhcularly describing 
the pi tec to be searc In d md the person or thing to be 
sc I7ed 1B% 
S< i 1 (i (loin ol pr r < li ind of the p ress — 
Lib t !} 
No I »w sh ill be p isst d to ibridgc oi rcsti un the 
freedom of speech or of the press In all criminal pros 
editions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jurv and if it shall appear to the jury th it the 
matter charged as libelous is true and was published 
with good motives and foi justifiable ends, the party 
shall be acquitted and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact 18% 
S H lb (No impr i sonment foi d b( I xcep-
tion I 
II H sh ill 1M no mipuson i il I debt except in 
( ise s of ibsc onding debtors 18% 
See 17 | Elec t ions to be free — Soldiers voting. 1 
All elections shill be free and no power civil or 
uubtiTN sh ill it my time intc rfere to prevent the 
(ice exercise of the light of suffnge Soldiers in time 
ol war ma\ vote at the ir post of duty m or out of the 
State under regulations to be1 prescribed by law 18% 
i IK ( V H.in (icier b x post facto laws Im 
(i ii ing con t r ac t s I 
\ \\ \ vl'i nnclu i \ pusi laiU> law or law \m 
I mini the obligation of contracts shall be passed 
1896 
Sec 19 11 r eason defined Proof I 
lie ison against the State shall consist only in 
h w ing war against it or in adhering to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort No person shall be 
convicted of trenson unless on the testimony of two 
witm ssf s to tin s ime overt act 1896 
S P C ti) I M i h t r i M • n i b o i d m i i t e t o t h e c iv i l 
p o n i i | 
11 i ibt i h t i l b< tn s( r ic I suhordm it ion to t IK 
ni l power ind no soldier in time of peace shall be 
q u u d i e d in anv house without the consent of the 
owner nor in tun of w u except in a manner to be 
pt( sc» d>e d bv I n\ t«M 
Sec 21 |S l a \ c ty t o i b i d d c n l 
Nufhei slavery nor involuntary servitude except 
I1- i punishment for crime wheieof the party shall 
have been dul\ convicted shall exist withm this 
St ite i IM 
Se« 22 JPr ivatc proper ly Im public use | 
Ue property shall not be- taken or damaged foi 
• ise without just compensation mm 
I I r r evocab le f ranchises fo rb idden I 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any 
fi inchise privilege or immunity 1896 
Sec 24 (Uniform ope ra t ion of laws | 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation 1896 
Sec 25 l l t ights re ta ined by people 1 
Ibis enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
to nop in oi deny others retained by the people 1896 
(iii> property taken is a stallion, maie. 
colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, o\, hull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poul-
try; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was mote than $100 hut does not 
exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanoi if the value of (he 
property stolen was $100 or less 
(2) Any person who has been injured bv a violation 
of Subsection 76-6-40H( 1) may bring an action against 
any person mentioned in Subsection 76 6-40H(2)(dt 
for three times the amount of actual damages, if any 
sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit and teasonable 
attorneys' fees. iww> 
PART 5 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" denned. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facili-
tating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his 
authority or utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, 
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters anv writing 
so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transfer-
ence, publication or utterance purports to be the 
act of another, whether the* person is existent oi 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at 
a time or place or in a numbered sequence other 
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed 
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes print-
ing or any other method of recording information, 
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, 
right, privilege, or identification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the 
writing is or purports to be: 
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other in-
strument or writing issued by a government, or 
any agency thereof; or 
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or 
more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other in-
strument or writing representing an inlet est in 
or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest 
in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the 
writing is or purports to be a check with a face 
amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class 
A misdemeanor. 1975 
76-6-502. Possess ion of forged writing or device 
for writing. 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly 
possesses any writing that is a forgery as defined in 
Section 76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud know-
ingly possesses any device for making any such writ-
ing, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, except 
where the altering, making, completion, execution, 
issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of such 
writing would constitute a clars A misdemeanor, in 
which event the possession of the writing or device for 
making such a writing shall constitute a class A mis-
demeanor. 1974 
76-6-503. Fraudulent handling of recordable 
writings. 
(1 > Any person who with intent to deceive or injun 
anyone falsi ties, destroys, removes, or conceals anj 
will, deed, mortgage, security instrument, or othei 
writing for which HK» law provides public recording!! 
guilty of fraudulent handling of recordable writing* 
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings iss 
felony of the third degree. 1973 
76-6-501. Tampering with records. 
M) Any person who, having no privilege to do 80, 
knowingly falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceall 
any writing, other than the writings enumerated in 
Section 76-6-503, or record, public or private, with 
intent to deceive or injure any person or to conceal 
any wrongdoing is guilt v of tampering with records. 
(2) Tampering with records is a class B misde-
meanor. 1171 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Pre* 
sumption. 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or 
draft for the payment of money, for the purpose of 
obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, orcor» 
poration, any money, property, or other thing of value 
or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or 
rerrt, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and 
payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing 
a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues 
a check or draft for which payment is refused by the 
drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would 
not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at 
the time of issue 
(2) Anv person who issues or passes a checker 
draft for the payment of money, for the purpose of 
obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or CQf» 
poration, any monev, property, or other thing of value 
or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or 
rent, payment of which check or draft is legally it* 
fused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check 
or draft if he fails to make good and actual payment 
to the payee in the amount of the refused checker 
draft within 14 days of his receiving actual noticeof 
the check or draft's nonpayment. "*l 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall 
be punished as follows: ^' 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checksflf) 
drafts made or drawn in this state within apa^ 
riod not exceeding six months amounts to a SUB 
of not more than $200, such offense shall be I; 
class H misdemeanor. % 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drato 
made or drawn in this state within a period net 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceed^  
ing $200 but not more than $300, such offenef-
shall be a class A misdemeanor. *1 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or draft* 
made or drawn in this state within a period not? 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceed 
ing $300 but not more than $1,000, such ofFentj^  
shall be a felony of the third degree. " ^ 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or draftr 
made or drawn in this state within a period nek 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exoaefe 
ing $1,000, such offense shall be a second degztfj 
felony. 
76-6-506. Financial transaction card offense* 
Definitions. 
For purposes of this part: 
76-10-1907 CRIMINAL CODE zyo 
(ii) as part of a pattern of illegal activity 
involving transactions exceeding $100,000 
in any 12-month period 
(2) The Utah Division of Investigation shall en-
force compliance with Subsection (1) and is custodian 
of all information and documents filed under Subsec-
tion (1). The information is confidential except any 
law enforcement agency, county attorney, district at-
torney, or the attorney general, when establishing a 
clear need for the information for investigative pur-
poses, shall have access and shall maintain the infor-
mation in a confidential manner except as otherwise 
provided by the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
199.1 
76-10-1907. Separate offenses. 
(1) Under this part each individual currency trans-
action exceeding $10,000 and made in violation of 
Subsection 76-10-1906(1) or each financial transac-
tion in violation of Section 76-10-1903 or 76-10-1904 
involving the movement of funds in excess of $10,000 
is a separate punishable offense. 
(2) Under this part each failure to file a report as 
required under Subsection 76-10-1906(1) is a sepa-
rate punishable ofTense. 1989 
76-10-1908. Forfe i ture — G r o u n d s — P r o c e d u r e 
— Disposi t ion of p r o p e r t y forfeited. 
(1) Any of the following property shall be subject to 
civil forfeiture and no property right exists in it: 
(a) any conveyance including vehicles, air-
craft, watercraft, or other vessel used in violation 
of Section 76-10-1904; 
(67 any property mvofvecrYn a fmaricraY trans-
action in violation of Section 76-10-1903; and 
(c) any monetary instruments or funds which 
are the subject of a violation of Section 
76-10-1903, 76-10-1904, or 76-10-1906. 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under Subsection 
(1) may be seized by any peace otficer of this state 
upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction 
over the property. HnwovfM, nei'/iue without process 
may be made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or 
search under a search warrant, an inspection un-
der an administrative inspection warrant, under 
a writ of attachment, or under a writ of garnish-
ment; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the 
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in 
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding un-
der this section; or 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the property has been used in violation 
of Section 76-10-1903, 76-10-1904, or 76-10-1906. 
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), 
proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted 
promptly. 
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is 
ment agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having 
jurisdiction. When property is seized under this chap-
ter, the appropriate person or agency m a y 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated 
by it or the warrant under which it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it 
to an appropriate location for disposition in ac-
cordance with law. 
(5) When any property is subject to civil forfeiture, 
a determination for forfeiture to the state shall be 
made as follows: 
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation 
shall be prepared by the prosecuting agency 
where the property was seized or is to be seized. 
A complaint shall be filed in the circuit or district 
court if the property is not real property and the 
value is less than $20, Of It). The complaint shall 
be filed in the district court if the value of prop-
erty other than real property is $20,000 or more 
or the property is real property If the complaint 
includes property under the jurisdiction of the 
circuit court and also property under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the district court, the com-
plaint shall be filed in the district court. The 
complaint shall describe with reasonable particu-
lar i ty 
(i) the property which is the subject mat-
ter of the proceedings; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; 
and 
(iii) the allegations which constitute a ba-
sis for forfeiture. 
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the 
court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure 
of the property which is the subject matter of the 
action and deliver it to a peace officer for service, 
unless the property has previously been seized 
without a warrant under Subsection (2). If the 
property was seized under Subsection (2), the 
warrant of seizure shall be delivered to the offi-
cer having custody of the property who shall pro-
ceed as directed in the warrant. 
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfei-
ture snaft ne (i(ed wi((\ l(w county cferk, aad 
served together with a copy of the complaint, 
upon all persons known to the prosecuting 
agency to have a claim in the property by one of 
the following methods* 
(i) upon each claimant whose name and 
address is known, at the last known address 
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose 
right, title, or interest is of record in the Di-
vision ot Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy 
of the notice and complaint by certified mail 
to the address given upon the records of the 
division, which service is considered com-
plete even though the mail is refused or can-
not be forwarded; and 
(ii) upon all other claimants whose ad-
dresses are unknown, but who are believed 
to have an interest in the property, by one 
publication in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in the county where the seizure was 
made. 
(d) Except under Subsection (5)(e), any claim-
ant or interested party shall file with the court a 
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days 
after service has been obtained. 
(e) When property is seized under this section, 
any interested person or claimant of the profh 
erty, prior to being served with a complaint un-
der this section, may file a petition in the court 
having jurisdiction for release of his interest in 
the property. The petition shall specify the claim-
ant's interest in the property and his right to 
have it released. A copy shall be served upon the 
county attorney in the county of the seizure, who 
shall answer the petition within 20 days. A peti-
tioner need not answer a complaint of forfeiture, 
(f) After 20 days following service of a com-
plaint or petition for release, the court shall ex-
amine the record and if no answer is on file, the 
court shall allow the complainant or petitioner 
CRIMINAL CODE 76-10-1908 
in opportunity to piesent evidence in suppoit ol 
his claim and ordei foifeituie oi lelease ol the 
property as the court determines 11 a piosecuting 
Igency has not filed an answei to a petition foi 
release and the court determines from the evi-
dence that the petitioner is not entitled to lecov 
Bry of the property, it shall entei an older direct 
ing the prosecuting agency to answei the petition 
within ten days If no answer is filed within that 
penod, the court shall order the lelease oi the 
property to the petitionei entitled to leceive it 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition 
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the couit 
shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days 
At this hearing all interested paities ma) 
present evidence of their rights of release of the 
property following the state's evidence foi foifei 
ture The court shall deteimine by a pieponder 
ance of the evidence the issues in the case and 
order forfeiture oi lelease of the piopeily as it 
determines 
(h) When the court determines that claimants 
have no right in the propel ty in whole or in par t, 
it shall declare the property to be foifeited and 
direct it to be deliveied as provided m Subsection 
(6) 
(l) When the couit determines that piopeity, 
in whole or in part, is not subject to forfeituie it 
shall order release of the piopeity to the pioper 
claimant If the court detei mines that the pi op 
erty is subject to forfeiture and release in pait, it 
shall order partial lelease and paitial foifeituie 
When the property cannot be divided loi paitial 
forfeiture and release, the unnt shall oider it 
sold and the pioceeds distributed 
0) first, to defra> the costs of the action, 
including seizure, stoiage of the piopeity, le 
gal costs of filing and pui suing the foi lei 
ture, and costs of sale, 
(n) second, piopoitionally among the le 
gitimate claimants, and 
(ill) third, as piovided undei Subsection 
(6) 
r6) Disposition of all piopeity toifeited undei Sub 
Aions (1) through (5) by a finding of the couit that 
person is entitled to iecov< I the piopeity shall be 
follows 
(a) Pioperty foifeited undei Subsections (l)(a), 
(b), or (c), if the property is involved in a finan-
cial transaction in violation of Section 
76-10-1903 or is transported in violation of Sec 
tion 76-10-1904, may be awarded to the seizing 
agency upon a petition the pioperty in the com 
plaint filed under Subsection (5Ha) and a finding 
by the court that the seizing agency is able to use 
the forfeited piopeity in the enforcement of of 
fenses under Title 58 and Title 76, Chapter 10 
(b) If the seizing agency makes no application 
or the court does not make a finding undei Sub 
section (6)(a) that the seizing agency should be 
awarded the pioperty, the forfeited property 
shall be deposited in the custody of the Division 
of Finance Any state agency, buieau, county, 
municipality, or di ug strike force which demon 
strates a need foi specific property oi classes of 
property which has been foifeited shall be given 
the property for use in enfoi cement of laws pio 
hibiting specified unlawful activity or in enforce 
ment of this pait after payment to the prosecut 
ing agency of legal costs for filing and pursuing 
the forfeiture and upon the application for the 
nrnnprrv in the directoi of the Division of Fi 
nance The application shall clearly set forth the 
need foi the property and the use to which the 
piopeity will be put 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance 
shall review all applications for property depos-
ited undei Subsection (6Kb) and make a determi-
nation based on necessity and advisability as to 
final disposition and shall notify the designated 
applicant, who may obtain the property after 
payment of all costs to the appropriate depart-
ment The Division of Finance shall reimburse 
the piosecuting agency for costs of filing and pur 
suing the forfeiture action not to exceed the 
amount of the net pioceeds leceived tiom the sale 
ol the piopeity 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an applica 
tion undei Subsections (6Ha), (b), oi (c), the Divi 
sion of finance shall dispose of the property by 
public bidding ot, as consideicd appiopnate, by 
dcstiuction Pioceeds fioiu the sale of the pi op 
city undei this subsection shall be distiibuted as 
provided in Subsection (e) 
(e) Propeity forfeited undei Subsection (l)(c) 
for violation of Subsection 76 10 1906 and pio 
ceeds iiom the sale ot the piopeitv under Suhsec 
tion (6)(d) shall be awarded and oidered distrib 
uted to the General Fund 
(7) Any peison who violates any piovision of Sec-
tion 76 10 1901, 76 10 1904 oi 76 10 1906 shall for 
felt to the state all piopeity, funds, oi monetary in 
struments involved in the violation oi, if unavailable 
for foifeituie in species its value whether oi not lo 
cated in this state 
(8) Upon conviction foi violating any piovision of 
Section 76 10 1903, 76 10 1904, oi 76 10 1906, the 
couit may make an oidei with respect to any property 
of the defendant, or in which the defendant has an 
inteiest, whether or not in this state, to accomplish oi 
further the foifeituie piovided under Subsection (7) 
oi the collection of costs under this section 
(9) All lights, title and inteiest in toifeitable prop 
eity desciibed in this section vest in the state upon 
the commission of the ac t oi conduct giving i lse to the 
foiteiture under this section 
(10) (a) Aftei forfeituie of pioperty under this sec-
tion the couit shall duect the disposition of the 
piopeity by sale oi othei commeicially feasible 
means, making provision foi the lights of any 
innocent pel sons Any propei ty right or interest 
not exercisable by oi transferable for value to the 
state expires and does not teveil to the defen-
dant The defendant oi any person acting in con-
ceit with or on behalf of the defendant is not 
eligible to puichase forfeited pioperty at any sale 
oidered by the couit 
(b) The couit may lestiain oi stay the sale or 
disposition of the propei ty pending the conclu-
sion of any appeal of the criminal case giving rise 
to the forfeiture, if the applicant demonstrates 
that proceeding with the sale oi disposition of the 
propei ty would lesult in lneparable injury, 
harm, or loss to him 
(c) The pioceeds ot any sale or other disposi-
tion of property forfeited under this section or 
any monies forfeited may be used first to pay the 
expenses of the forfeituie and the sale including 
expenses of seizuie, maintenance, and custody of 
the propei ty pending its disposition, advertising, 
and couit costs 
(d) Disposition ot piopeity foifeited under Sub 
sections (7) through (13) shall be as provided in 
Subsection (6) 
UtlSKJ 
(e) Notwithstanding any provisions of litis s'*'' 
lion to the contrary, the stale is obligated <o 
search the lion records applicable to the forfeit 
able property to determine whether any valid 
lien against the property has been perfected. As 
long as the lien holder did not violate the provi 
sions of this section, till" to forfeitable properly 
shail be subject to such lien, and 1he slate will 
either give possession oft he property to the lien 
holder or pay to the lien holder the amount se 
cured by the lien. 
(11) In any forfeiture proceeding under Subsec-
tions (7) through (I'D, the prosecutor prosecuting the 
defendant may: 
(a) petition the court for mitigation or remis-
sion of forfeiture, for restoration of forfeited prop 
erty to victims of a violation of this section or to 
take any other action to protect the rights of in-
nocent persons in the interest of justice and the 
court may, in its discretion, giant the petition; 
fb) compromise claims arising under this sec 
tion; 
(c) award compensation to persons providing 
information resulting in a forfeiture under this 
section; or 
(d) take appropriate measures necessary to 
safeguard and maintain properly ordered lor 
feited under this section pending its disposition. 
(12) In a proceeding under Ibis section where for-
feiture is declared, in whole or in part, the '-ourI 
shall: 
(a) determine the costs incurred by the prose-
cuting agency prosecuting the forfeiture which 
shall be paid by the recipient of forfeited assets 
from the proceeds from the assets; arrd 
(b) assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding 
including seizure and storage of the property 
against the individual or individuals whose con 
duct was the basis for the forfeiture, and may 
assess costs against any other claimant or claim 
ants to the properly as appropriate. 
(13) Proceedings under this section arc indepen-
dent of any other proceedings whether civil or crimi 
rral under this section or the laws of this st.ate. IW:I 
PA HI 20 
SECURITY OF RESEARCH FACILITIES 
76-10-2001. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its commonly-ac-
cepted meaning, means any waler craft, aircraft, 
trailer, sleeping car. or other structure or vehicle 
adapted for overnight accommodations of persons 
or for carrying on business and includes: 
fa) each separately secured or occupied 
portion of the building or vehicle; arrd 
fb) each structure appurtenant or con-
nected to the building or vehicle. 
(2) "Enter** means: 
fa) an intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) the intrusion of any physical object. 
sound wave, light ray, electronic signal, or 
other means of intrusion under- the control of 
the actor. 
(3) "Research" means studious arrd serious in-
quiry, examination, investigation, or experimen-
tation aimed at the discovery, examination, or 
accumulation of facts, data, devices, theories, 
technologies, or applications done for any public, 
governmental, proprietorial, or teaching purpose. 
i4) "Research facility" means any building, or 
separately seemed yard. pad. pond, laboratory, 
pasture, pen, or corral which is not open to the 
public, the major vise of which is to conduct re-
search, to bruise research subjects, to store sup-
plies, equipment, samples, specimens, records, 
data, prototypes, or othe? property used in or 
generated (mm ves»n\vch. WW 
70-10-2002. Burglary of a research facility — 
Penalties. 
f I ) A person is guilty of burglary of a research fa-
cility if he enters or i"mains unlawfully in a research 
facility with the intent to: 
fa) obtain unauthorized control over any prop-
er tv, sarrrple, specimen, record, data, test result, 
or proprietary information in the facility; 
(h) alter or eradicate any sample, specimen, 
record, dala, test result, or* proprietary informa-
tion in (he facility; 
<c> damage, deface, or destroy any property in 
the facility; 
id) release from confinement or remove any 
animal, or biological vector in the facility regard-
less of whether or not that animal or vector is 
dangerous; 
le) commit an assault on any person; 
<f> commit any other felony; or 
fg) inter fete with the personnel or operations 
of a research facility through any conduct that 
does rrot constitute an assault. 
(2) A person who violates Subsection (l)(g) is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. A person who vio-
lates any other provision in this section is guilty of a 
felony of the second degree 1989 
PART 21 
MISUSE OF RFC Yi'LING BINS 
70-10-2101. Use of recycling bins — Prohibited 
items —•• Penalties. 
( I ) As used in this section: 
in> "Recycling" means the process of collecting 
materials diverted from the waste stream for re-
use. 
<hr "Recycling bin" moans anv receptacle made 
available to the public by a governmental entity 
or private business for the collection of any 
source-separated it-em for recycling purposes. 
*2) It. is an infraction to place any prohibited item 
or substance in a recycling bin if the hin is posted 
with the following information printed legibly in ba-
sic English: 
(a) a descriptive list of the items that may be 
deposited in the recycling bin, entitled in bold-
face capital letters: "ITEMS YOU MAY DE-
POSIT IN THIS RECYCLING BIN:"; 
(b) at the ^r\(\ of the list in Subsection (a), the 
following statement in boldface capital letters: 
"REMOVING FROM THIS BIN ANY ITEM 
THAT IS LISTED ABOVE AND THAT Y'OU 
DID NOT PLACE IN THE CONTAINER IS THE 
CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF THEFT, PUNISH-
ABLE BY LAW"; 
fc) the following statement in boldface capital 
letters: "DEPOSIT OF ANY OTHER ITEM IN 
THIS RECYCLING BIN IS AGAINST THE 
LAW."; 
(d) the following statement in boldface capital 
letters, posted on the recycling collection con-
tainer in close proximity to the notices required 
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
prosecution because of failure of jury to agree 
after successive trials. 4 A.L.R.4th L274. 
What constitutes 'manifest necessity" for 
state prosecutor's dismissal of action, allowing 
subsequent tr ial despite jeopardy's having at-
tached, 14 A.L.R.4th 1014. 
Key Numbers . — Criminal Law 3=» 574^ 
576. 
Rule 26. Appeals. 
• a) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken a notice of appeal stating the order or judgment appealed from 
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party or his attorney of record. 
Proof of service of such copy shall be filed with the court. 
ib) An appeal may be taken by the defendant: 
(1) From the final judgment of conviction; 
(2) From an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial 
rights of the defendant; 
(3) From an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the 
Supreme Court decides that such an appeal would be in the interest of 
justice; or 
(4) From any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a 
mental disease or defect, incompetent to proceed further in a pending 
prosecution. 
«c) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution: 
(1) From a final judgment of dismissal; 
(2) From an order arresting judgment: 
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of 
double jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial: 
'4) From a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part thereof 
invalid: or 
<5i From an order of the court granting a pre-trial motion to suppress 
evidence when, upon a petition for review, the Supreme Court decides 
that such an appeal would be in the interest of justice, 
•d) (1) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the 
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving such notice 
shall be filed with the court. 
(2) No appeal shall be dismissed except for a material defect in the 
taking thereof, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the 
appellant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless an-
other appeal can be, and is, timely taken. 
'e> Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be 
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
< f) Appeals may be submitted on briefs and if an appellant's brief is filed 
the appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon due notice of the hear-
ing, shall fail to appear for oral argument. 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 21 Am. Ju r . 2d 859 to S65. 
Criminal Law *§ 512 to 519; 21A Am. Jur . 2d 
317 to 342, Criminal Law S§ 859 to 375. 
C .J .S . - 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law $ 468. 
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of statute 
authorizing dismissal of criminal action upon 
set t lement of civil liability growing out of act 
charged. 42 A.L.R.3d 315. 
Propriety of court's dismissing indictment or 
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(gj The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals shall govern criminal 
appeals to the Supreme Court except as otherwise provided. 
(h) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed, the case 
shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after 
certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless the time is 
extended by the Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence 
of death shall have priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in 
disposition by the Supreme Court. 
(i) The rules of practice for district and circuit courts promulgated by the 
judicial council and approved by the Supreme Court relating to appeals from 
circuit courts shall govern criminal as well as civil appeals. 
(j) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from all final orders and 
judgments rendered in a district court or juvenile court in accordance with the 
provisions of this rule. 
ik) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment rendered 
in the justice court in accordance with the provision of this rule, except as 
follows: 
'1) The case shall be tried anew in the district court and the decision of 
the district court shall be final except in cases where the validity or 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court: 
12) Within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court 
shall transmit to the district court a certified copy of the docket, the 
original pleadings, all notices, motions and other papers filed in the case 
and the notice ana undertaking on appeal: 
3) Stay of execution and relief pending appeal shall be in accordance 
with Rule 27; and 
14) All further proceedings shall be in the district court, including any-
process required to enforce judgment. 
(77-35-26, enacted by L. 1980. ch. 14. $ 1: L. 1983, ch. 51. $ 1.: 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment suostituted 'Rule 27" for 'Rule 30" :n 
Subsection • k>«3). 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule governs ap-
peals to the Supreme Court from district and 
circuit courts. The practice and procedure for 
taking such appeals, including the rime in 
which the appeal is filed, is prescribed by -.he 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Cross-References. — Appeal lies from finai 
judgments. Utah Const.. Art. VIII. Sec. 9. 
ADpeais from circuit court '0 district court. 
? 78-4-11. 
Appeals from district court. Utah Const.. 
Art. VIII. Sec. 9. 
Appeals from justice's court to district court. 
Utah Const.. Art. VIII. Sec. 9: 5 78-5-14. 
ADpeilate jurisdiction of district courts. Utah 
Const.. Art. VIII. Sec. 7: * 78-3-4. 
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court. 
Utah Const.. Art. VIII. Sec. 4: * 78-2-2. 
Applicability of Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure. Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 1. 
Dismissal if affidavit n impecumositv -.s 
antrue. $ 21-7-7. 
Right of defendant to appeal. Utah Const.. 
Art. I. Sec. 12: $ 77-L-tf. 
Right of indigent accused 10 counsel m ap-
peal. ? 77-32-1 et seq. 
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[439 US 379] 
ALDO COLAUTTI, Secretary of Welfare of Pennsylvania, et al., Appellants, 
v 
JOHN FRANKLIN et al. 
439 US 379, 58 L Ed 2d 596, 99 S Ct 675 
[No. 77-891] 
Argued October 3, 1978. Decided January 9, 1979. 
SUMMARY 
In an action brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania prior to the effective date of the Pennsylvania 
Abortion Control Act, the District Court held unconstitutional certain 
provisions of the Act, among others, the viability determination and stan-
dard of care provisions of § 5(a) of the Act, requiring, upon pain of penal 
sanction for its violation, that every person performing or inducing an 
abortion (1) make a determination "based on his experience, judgment, or 
professional competence that the fetus is not viable," and (2) upon determin-
ing that a fetus "is viable or . . . may be viable" to "exercise that degree of 
professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the 
fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve 
the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted" and to 
adopt that abortion technique "which would provide the best opportunity 
for the fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not 
be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother" (401 F 
Supp 554). On direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court from the 
decision of the three-judge District Court, the Supreme Court vacated part 
of the District Court's judgment and remanded the case (49 L Ed 2d 1204). 
Among other things, the three-judge District Court, on remand, adhered to 
its original view regarding § 5(a)'s unconstitutionality, and declared § 5(a)'s 
provisions invalid on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. 
On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. In an 
opinion by BLACKMUN, J., joined by BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, POWELL, 
and STEVENS, JJ., it was held that § 5(a) of the Act was unconstitutionally 
vague both as to its requirement for determining viability and as to its 
requirement concerning standard of care. 
Briefs of Counsel, p 959, infra. 
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[455 US 489] 
VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES, et al., Appellants, 
v 
FLIPSIDE, HOFFMAN ESTATES, INC. 
455 US 489, 71 L Ed 2d 362, 102 S Ct 1186, reh den (US) 72 L Ed 2d 476, 
102 S Ct 2023 
[No. 80-1681] 
Argued December 9, 1981. Decided March 3, 1982. 
Decision: Municipal ordinance requiring license to sell "items designed or 
marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs," held not unconstitution-
ally vague or overbroad. 
SUMMARY 
A village enacted an ordinance regulating the sale of drug paraphernalia. 
The ordinance requires a business to obtain a license if it sells any items 
that are "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs". A 
store selling drug paraphernalia in the village brought an action in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois challenging 
the ordinance prior to its enforcement as unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad. The District Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reversed, holding that the ordinance was impermissibly vague on its face 
(639 F2d 373). 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In 
an opinion by MARSHALL, J., expressing the view of BURGER, Ch. J., and 
BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., it was held 
that (1) the ordinance did not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of 
a merchandiser of items purported to be regulated by the ordinance and was 
not overbroad as inhibiting the First Amendment rights of other parties 
since (a) the ordinance does not restrict speech as such but simply regulates 
the commercial marketing of items that the labels reveal may be used for 
an illicit purpose and thus the ordinance does not embrace noncommercial 
speech, (b) insofar as any commercial speech interest was implicated, it was 
only the attenuated interest in displaying and marketing merchandise in 
the manner the retailer desires, and (c) it was irrelevant whether the 
Briefs of Counsel, p 974, infra. 
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US 87, 90, 15 L Ed 2d 176, 86 S Ct 
211 (1965). Our concern here is 
based upon the "potential for arbi-
trarily suppressing First Amend-
ment liberties. . . ." Id., at 91, 15 L 
Ed 2d 176, 86 S Ct 211. In addition, 
§ 647(e) implicates consideration of 
the constitutional right to freedom 
of movement. See Kent v Dulles, 357 
US 116, 126, 12 L Ed 2d 1204, 78 S 
Ct 1113 (1958); Aptheker v Secretary 
of State, 378 US 500, 505-506, 12 L 
Ed 2d 992, 84 S Ct 1659 (1964).* 
[461 US 359] 
Section 647(e) is not simply a 
"stop-and-identify" statute. Rather, 
the statute requires that the individ-
ual provide a "credible and reliable'' 
identification that carries a "reason-
able assurance" of its authenticity, 
and that provides "means for later 
getting in touch with the person who 
has identified himself." Solomon, 33 
8. [9b] In his dissent, Justice White claims 
that ,f[t]he upshot of our cases is that 
whether or not a statute purports to regulate 
constitutionally protected conduct, it should 
not be held unconstitutionally vague on its 
face unless it is vague in all of its possible 
applications." Post, at 370, 75 L Ed 2d, at 
917-918. The description of our holdings is 
inaccurate in several respects First, it ne-
glects the fact that we permit a facial chal-
lenge if a law reaches "a substantial amount 
of constitutionally protected conduct" Hoff-
man Estates v Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc , 
455 US 489, 494, 71 L Ed 2d 362, 102 S Ct 
1186 (1982) Second, where a statute imposes 
criminal penalties, the standard of certainty 
is higher. See Winters v New York, 333 US 
507, 515, 92 L Ed 840, 68 S Ct 665 (1948) This 
concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a 
criminal statute on its face even when it 
could conceivably have had some valid appli-
cation. See, e.g, Colautti v Franklin, 439 US 
379, 394-401, 58 L Ed 2d 596, 99 S Ct 675 
(1979); Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306 US 451, 85 
L Ed 888, 59 S Ct 618 (1939) The dissent 
concedes that "the overbreadth doctrine per-
mits facial challenge of a law that reaches a 
substantial amount of conduct protected by 
the First Amendment . " Post, at 371, 75 L 
Ed 2d, at 918. However, in the dissent's view, 
one may not "confuse vagueness and over-
breadth by attacking the enactment as being 
vague as applied to conduct other than his 
Cal App 3d, at 438, 108 Cal Rptr, at 
872-873. In addition, the suspect 
may also have to account for his 
presence "to the extent it assists in 
producing 
[461 US 360] 
credible and reliable iden-
tification.,, Id., at 438, 108 Cal Rptr, 
at 872. 
[10a] At oral argument, the appel-
lants confirmed that a suspect vio-
lates § 647(e) unless "the officer [is] 
satisfied that the identification is 
reliable." Tr of Oral Arg 6. In giving 
examples of how suspects would sat-
isfy the requirement, appellants ex-
plained that a jogger, who was not 
carrying identification, could, de-
pending on the particular officer, be 
required to answer a series of ques-
tions concerning the route that he 
followed to arrive at the place where 
the officers detained him,9 or could 
satisfy the identification require-
own " Post, at 37'), 75 L Ed 2d, at 917. But we 
have traditionally viewed vagueness and over-
breadth as logically related and similar doc-
trines See, e g , Keyishian v Board of Re-
gents, 385 US 589, 609, 17 L Ed 2d 629, 87 S 
Ct 675 (1967); NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 
433, 9 L Ed 2d 405, 83 S Ct 328 (1963) See 
also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in 
the Supreme Court, 109 U Pa L Rev 67, 110-
113(1960) 
No authority cited by the dissent supports 
its argument about facial challenges in the 
arbitrary enforcement context. The dissent 
relies heavily on Parker v Levy, 417 US 733, 
41 L Ed 2d 439, 94 S Ct 2547 (1974), but in 
that case we deliberately applied a less strin-
gent vagueness analysis "[b]ecause of the fac-
tors differentiating military society from civil-
ian society " Id , at 756, 41 L Ed 2d 439, 94 S 
Ct 2547 Hoffman Estates, supra, also relied 
upon by the dissent, does not support its 
position In addition to reaffirming the valid-
ity of facial challenges in situations where 
free speech or free association are affected, 
see 455 US, at 494, 495, 498-499, 71 L Ed 2d 
362, 102 S Ct 1186, the Court emphasized that 
the ordinance in Hoffman Estates "simply 
regulates business behavior*' and that "eco-
nomic regulation is subject to a less strict 
vagueness test because its subject matter is 
often more narrow." Id , at 499, 498, 71 L Ed 
2d 362, 102 S C t 1186 
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facial validity of § 6^ valu-
ating a facial cha' state 
law, a federal cou: jourse, 
consider any limiting instruction 
that a state court or enforcement 
agency has proffered." Hoffman Es-
tates v Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 
Inc., 455 US 489, 494, n 5, 71 L Ed 
2d 362, 102 S Ct 1186 (1982). As 
construed by the California Court of 
Appeal,4 § 647(e) requires that an 
individual 
[461 US 356] 
provide "credible and reli-
able" identification when requested 
by a police officer who has reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity 
sufficient to justify a Terry deten-
3. The appellants have apparently never 
challenged the propriety of declaratory and 
injunctive relief in this case. See Steffel v 
Thompson, 415 US 452, 39 L Ed 2d 505, 94 S 
Ct 1209 (1974). Nor have appellants ever chal-
lenged Lawson's standing to seek such relief. 
We note that Lawson has been stopped on 
approximately 15 occasions pursuant to 
§ 647(e), and that these 15 stops occurred in a 
period of less than two years. Thus, there is a 
"credible threat" that Lawson might be de-
tained again under § 647(e). See Ellis v Dyson, 
421 US 426, 434, 44 L Ed 2d 274, 95 S Ct 1691 
(1975). 
4. [3b, 4b] In Wainwright v Stone, 414 US 
21, 22-23, 38 L Ed 2d 179, 94 S a 190 (1973), 
we held that "[f]or the purpose of determining 
whether a state statute is too vague and 
indefinite to constitute valid legislation 'we 
must take the statute as though it read pre-
cisely as the highest court of the State has 
interpreted i t ' Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v 
Probate Court, 309 US 270, 273 [84 L Ed 744, 
60 S a 523, 126 ALR 530] (1940)." The Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in its 
decision that the state intermediate appellate 
court has construed the statute in People v 
Solomon, 33 Cal App 3d 429, 108 Cal Rptr 867 
(1973), that the State Supreme Court has 
refused review, and that Solomon has been 
the law of California for nine years. In these 
circumstances, we agree with the Ninth Cir-
cuit that the Solomon opinion is authoritative 
for purposes of defining the meaning of 
§ 647(e). See 658 F2d 1362, 1364-1365, n 3 
(1981). 
5. [5b] The Solomon court apparently read 
Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L Ed 2d 889, 88 S 
Ct 1868, 44 Ohio Ops 2d 383 (1968) to hold 
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tion.8 People v Solomon, 33 Cal App 
3d 429, 108 Cal Rptr 867 
[461 US 357] 
(1973). "Cred-
ible and reliable" identification is de-
fined by the state Court of Appeal as 
identification "carrying reasonable 
assurance that the identification is 
authentic and providing means for 
later getting in touch with the per-
son who has identified himself." Id., 
at 438, 108 Cal Rptr, at 873. In addi-
tion, a suspect may be required to 
"account for his presence . . . to the 
extent it assists in producing credible 
and reliable identification.. . ."Id., at 
438, 108 Cal Rptr, at 872. Under the 
that the test for a Terry detention was 
whether the officer had information that 
would lead a reasonable man to believe that 
the intrusion was appropriate. The Ninth 
Circuit noted that according to Terry, the 
applicable test under the Fourth Amendment 
requires that the police officer making a de-
tention "be able to point to specific and arti-
culable facts which, taken together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion." 392 US, at 21, 20 L 
Ed 2d 889, 88 S a 1868, 44 Ohio Ops 2d 383. 
The Ninth Circuit then held that although 
what Solomon articulated as the Terry stan-
dard differed from what Terry actually held, 
"[w]e believe that the Solomon court meant to 
incorporate in principle the standards enunci-
ated in Terry." 658 F2d, at 1366, n 8. We 
agree with that interpretation of Solomon. Of 
course, if the Solomon court misread Terry 
and interpreted § 647(e) to permit investiga-
tive detentions in situations where the officers 
lack a reasonable suspicion of criminal activ-
ity based on objective facts, Fourth Amend-
ment concerns would be implicated. See 
Brown v Texas, 443 US 47, 61 L Ed 2d 357, 99 
S a 2637 (1979). 
In addition, the Solomon court appeared to 
believe that both the Terry detention and 
frisk were proper under the standard for 
Terry detentions, and since the frisk was 
more intrusive than the request for identifica-
tion, the request for identification must be 
proper under Terry. See 33 Cal App 3d, at 
435, 108 Cal Rptr, at 870-871. The Ninth 
Circuit observed that the Solomon analysis 
was "slightly askew." 658 F2d, at 1366, n 9. 
KOLENDER v LAWSON 
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terms of the statute, failure of the 
individual to provide "credible and 
reliable" identification permits the 
arrest.6 
Ill 
[6] Our Constitution is designed to 
maximize individual freedoms 
within a framework of ordered lib-
erty. Statutory limitations on those 
freedoms are examined for substan-
tive authority and content as well as 
for definiteness or certainty of ex-
pression. See generally M. Bassiouni, 
Substantive Criminal Law 53 (1978). 
[7, 8] As generally stated, the void-
for-vagueness doctrine requires that 
a penal statute define the criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness 
that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage ar-
bitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment. Hoffman Estates v Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., supra; Smith 
v Goguen, 415 US 566, 39 L Ec 2d 
605, 94 S Ct 1242 (1974); Grayned v 
City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 33 L 
Ed 2d 222, 92 S a 2294 (1972); 
Papachristou v City of Jacksonville, 
405 US 156, 31 L Ed 2d 110, 92 S Ct 
839 (1972); Connally v General Con-
struction Co., 269 US 385, 70 L Ed 
322, 46 S Ct 126 (1926). Although 
the doctrine focuses 
[461 US 358] 
both on actual no-
tice to citizens and arbitrary enforce-
The court reasoned that under Terry, the 
frisk, as opposed to the detention, is proper 
only if the detaining officer reasonably be-
lieves that the suspect may be armed and 
dangerous, in addition to having an articula-
ble suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 
6. In People v Caylor, 6 Cal App 3d 51, 56, 
85 Cal Rptr 497, 501 (1970), the court sug-
gested that the State must prove that a sus-
pect detained under § 647(e) was loitering or 
wandering for "evil purposes." However, in 
Solomon, which the court below and the par-
ties concede is "authoritative" in the absence 
of a California Supreme Court decision on the 
ment, we have recognized recently 
that the more important aspect of 
the vagueness doctrine "is not actual 
notice, but the other principal ele-
ment of the doctrine—the require-
ment that a legislature establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement" Smith, 415 US, at 
574, 39 L Ed 2d 605, 94 S Ct 1242. 
Where the legislature fails to pro-
vide such minimal guidelines, a 
criminal statute may permit "a stan-
dardless sweep [that] allows police-
men, prosecutors, and juries to pur-
sue their personal predilections." Id., 
at 575, 39 L Ed 2d 605, 94 S a 
1242.7 
[9a] Section 647(e), as presently 
drafted and as construed by the 
state courts, contains no standard 
for determining what a suspect has 
to do in order to satisfy the require-
ment to provide a "credible and reli-
able" identification. As such, the 
statute vests virtually complete dis-
cretion in the hands of the police to 
determine whether the suspect has 
satisfied the statute and must be 
permitted to go on his way in the 
absence of probable cause to arrest. 
An individual, whom police may 
think is suspicious but do not have 
probable cause to believe has com-
mitted a crime, is entitled to con-
tinue to walk the public streets 
"only at the whim of any police 
officer" who happens to stop that 
individual under § 647(e). Shuttles-
worth v City of Birmingham, 382 
issue, there is no discussion of any require-
ment that the State prove "evil purposes." 
7. Our concern for minimal guidelines finds 
its roots as far back as our decision in United 
States v Reese, 92 US 214, 221, 25 L Ed 563 
(1876): 
"It would certainly be dangerous if the 
legislature could set a net large enough to 
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the 
courts to step inside and say who could be 
rightfully detained, and who should be set at 
large. This would, to some extent, substitute 
the judicial for the legislative department of 
government." 
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Terry, the balance of interests de-
scribed in that case and its progeny 
must control. 
Second, it goes without saying that 
arrest and the threat of a criminal 
sanction have a substantial impact 
on interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, far more severe than 
[461 US 368] 
we have ever permitted on less than 
probable cause. Furthermore, the 
likelihood that innocent persons ac-
costed by law enforcement officers 
under authority of § 647(e) will have 
no realistic means to protect their 
rights compounds the severity of the 
intrusions on individual liberty that 
this statute will occasion. The ar-
rests it authorizes make a mockery 
of the right enforced in Brown v 
Texas, 443 US 47, 61 L Ed 2d 357, 99 
S Ct 2637 (1979), in which we held 
squarely that a State may not make 
it a crime to refuse to provide identi-
fication on demand in the absence of 
reasonable suspicion.5 If § 647(e) re-
mains in force, the validity of such 
arrests will be open to challenge 
only after the fact, in individual 
prosecutions for failure to produce 
identification. Such case-by-case 
scrutiny cannot vindicate the Fourth 
Amendment rights of persons like 
appellee, many of whom will not 
even be prosecuted after they are 
5. In Brown we had no need to consider 
whether the State can make it a crime to 
refuse to provide identification on demand 
during a seizure permitted by Terry, when 
the police have reasonable suspicion but not 
probable cause. See 443 US, at 53, n 3, 61 L 
Ed 2d 357, 99 S a 2637. 
6. Even after arrest, however, he may not 
be forced to answer questions against his will, 
and—in contrast to what appears to be nor-
mal procedure during Terry encounters—he 
will be so informed See Miranda v Arizona, 
384 US 436, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S a 1602, 10 
Ohio Misc 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 
974 (1966). In fact, if he indicates a desire to 
remain silent, the police, should cease ques-
tioning him altogether. Id., at 473-474, 16 L 
arrested, see ante, at 354, 75 L Ed 
2d, at 907. A pedestrian approached 
by police officers has no way of 
knowing whether the officers have 
"reasonable suspicion"—without 
which they may not demand identifi-
cation even under § 647(e), ante, at 
356, and n 5, 75 L Ed 2d, at 908— 
because that condition depends 
solely on the objective facts known 
to the officers and evaluated in light 
of their experience, see Terry v 
Ohio, 392 US, at 30, 20 L Ed 2d 889, 
88 S Ct 1868, 44 Ohio Ops 2d 383; 
United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
US, at 884-885, 45 L Ed 2d 607, 95 S 
Ct 2574. The pedestrian will know 
that to assert his rights may subject 
him to arrest and all that goes with 
it: new acquaintances among jailers, 
lawyers, prisoners, and bail bonds-
men, firsthand knowledge of local 
jail conditions, a "search incident to 
arrest," and the expense of defend-
ing against a possible prosecution.' 
The only response to be 
[461 US 369] 
expected is 
compliance with the officers' requests, 
whether or not they are based on rea-
sonable suspicion, and without regard 
to the possibility of later vindication 
in court. Mere reasonable suspicion 
does not justify subjecting the inno-
cent to such a dilemma.7 
Ed 2d 694, 86 S a 1602, 10 Ohio Misc 9, 36 
Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 974. 
7. When law enforcement officers have 
probable cause to believe that a person has 
committed a crime, the balance of interests 
between the State and the individual shifts 
significantly, so that the individual may be 
forced to tolerate restrictions on liberty and 
invasions of privacy that possibly will never 
be redressed, even if charges are dismissed or 
the individual is acquitted. Such individuals 
may be arrested, and they may not resist. But 
probable cause, and nothing less, represents 
the point at which the interests of law en-
forcement justify subjecting an individual to 
any significant intrusion beyond that sanc-
916 
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By defining as a crime the failure 
to respond to requests for personal 
information during a Terry encoun-
ter, and by permitting arrests upon 
commission of that crime, California 
attempts in this statute to compel 
what may not be compelled under 
the Constitution. Even if § 647(e) 
were not unconstitutionally vague, 
the Fourth Amendment would pro-
hibit its enforcement. 
Justice White, with whom Justice 
Rehnquist joins, dissenting. 
The usual rule is that the alleged 
vagueness of a criminal statute must 
be judged in light of the conduct 
that is charged to be violative of the 
statute. See, e.g., United States v 
Mazurie, 419 US 544, 550, 42 L Ed 
2d 706, 95 S a 710 (1975); United 
States v Powell, 423 US 87, 92-93, 
46 L Ed 2d 228, 96 S Ct 316 (1975). If 
the actor is given sufficient notice 
that his conduct is within the pro-
scription of the statute, his convic-
tion is not vulnerable on vagueness 
grounds, even if as applied to other 
conduct, the law would be unconsti-
tutionally vague. None of our cases 
"suggests that one who has received 
fair warning of the criminality of his 
own conduct from the statute in 
question is nonetheless entitled to 
[461 US 370] 
attack it because the language would 
not give similar fair warning with 
respect to other conduct which 
might be within its broad and literal 
ambit. One to whose conduct a stat-
ute clearly applies may not success-
fully challenge it for vagueness." 
Parker v Levy, 417 US 733, 756, 41 
L Ed 2d 439, 94 S a 2547 (1974). 
The correlative rule is that a crimi-
nal statute is not unconstitutionally 
vague on its face unless it is "imper-
tioned in Terry, including either arrest or the 
need to answer questions that the individual 
v LAWSON 
!d 903, 103 S Ct 1855 
missibly vague in all of its applica-
tions." Hoffman Estates v Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 US 489, 
497, 71 L Ed 2d 362, 102 S Ct 1186 
(1982). 
These general rules are equally 
applicable to cases where First 
Amendment or other "fundamental" 
interests are involved. The Court has 
held that in such circumstances 
"more precision in drafting may be 
required because of the vagueness 
doctrine in the case of regulation of 
expression," Parker v Levy, 417 US, 
at 756, 41 L Ed 2d 439, 94 S a 2547; 
a "greater degree of specificity" is 
demanded than in other contexts. 
Smith v Goguen, 415 US 566, 573, 39 
L Ed 2d 605, 94 S Ct 1242 (1974). 
But the difference in such cases "re-
lates to how strict a test of vague-
ness shall be applied in judging a 
particular criminal statute." Parker 
v Levy, supra, at 756, 41 L Ed 2d 
439, 94 S Ct 2547. It does not permit 
the challenger of the statute to con-
fuse vagueness and overbreadth by 
attacking the enactment as being 
vague as applied to conduct other 
than his own. See ibid. Of course, if 
his own actions are themselves pro-
tected by the First Amendment or 
other constitutional provision, or if 
the statute does not fairly warn that 
it is proscribed, he may not be con-
victed. But it would be unavailing 
for him to claim that although he 
knew his own conduct was unpro-
tected and was plainly enough for-
bidden by the statute, others may be 
in doubt as to whether their acts are 
banned by the law. 
The upshot of our cases, therefore, 
is that whether or not a statute 
purports to regulate constitutionally 
does not want to answer in order to avoid 
arrest or end a detention. 
917 
§ 10 UNITED STATED v MILLER 
Reported p 99, supra 
vent its transference as "harm-
less error" or by psychological 
effect, in spite of instructions for 
keeping separate transactions 
separate. 
§ 11. Manner or means of commit-
ting offense 
In the following cases, the Su-
preme Court held that there was no 
material variance where the evi-
dence did not establish all the alle-
gations in the indictment relating to 
the manner or means of committing 
the offense, the court pointing out 
that it was sufficient to sustain a 
conviction if the evidence showed 
that the' offense charged was com-
mitted in one of the ways alleged in 
the indictment. 
Affirming a conviction for a viola-
tion of a statute proscribing inter-
state transportation of a woman for 
immoral purposes, the court, in Ben-
nett v United States (1913) 227 US 
333, 57 L Ed 531, 33 S a 288, held 
that proof establishing the transpor-
tation of one woman, contrary to the 
statute, instead of two, as charged in 
the indictment, did not constitute a 
fatal variance. The court said that 
this was a contention which had 
more of technicality than substance. 
Reversing the judgment of a 
United States Court of Appeals 
which had reversed a judgment of 
conviction of defendants for engag-
ing in a combination and conspiracy 
to restrain interstate trade and com-
merce contrary to the Sherman Act, 
the Supreme Court, in United States 
v Brims (1926) 272 US 549, 71 L Ed 
403, 47 S a 169, disagreed with the 
Court of Appeals that there was a 
fatal variance between the indict-
ment and the evidence, where the 
indictment charged the defendants 
with combining or conspiring to pre-
vent manufacturing plants located 
outside the city of Chicago and other 
states than Illinois from selling and 
delivering their building material in 
and shipping it to Chicago, and 
where the proof disclosed merely an 
agreement between the defendants 
whereby the union defendants were 
not to work upon nonunion-made 
millwork, whether produced in or 
out of Illinois. According to the Su-
preme Court, the allegations of the 
indictment were sufficient to cover a 
combination like the one which 
some of the evidence tended to show, 
and it was a matter of no conse-
quence that the purpose was to shut 
out nonunion millwork made within 
Illinois as well as that made with-
out. The Supreme Court pointed out 
that the crime of restraining inter-
state commerce through combina-
tion was not condoned by the inclu-
sion of intrastate commerce as well. 
In United States v Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co. (1940) 310 US 150, 84 L Ed 
1129, 60 S Ct 811, the court said 
that a variation between the means 
charged in an indictment to have 
been employed by members of an 
alleged conspiracy in restraint of 
trade in violation of the Sherman 
Act and the means shown by the 
proof to have been utilized was not 
fatal. Affirming the convictions in a 
United States District Court, the Su-
preme Court held that an indict-
ment under the Act charging certain 
oil companies with combining and 
conspiring together for the purpose 
of artificially raising and fixing the 
spot market tank car price of gaso-
line, and with having done so by 
participating in buying programs for 
the purchase of gasoline from inde-
pendent refiners, pursuant to allot-
ments among themselves, at uni-
formly high and at times progres-
sively increasing prices, and alleging 
that certain trade journals were 
"the chief agencies and instrumen-
talities" through which the illegally 
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as previously is a question of fact,5 and the 
lienors have not marshalled evidence to 
demonstrate that the district court's find-
ing on this question is clearly erroneous. 
Attorney Fees 
[5] The district court awarded attorney 
fees to Deseret Federal, an award which is 
not questioned on appeal, and Deseret Fed-
eral seeks a similar award of the fees it 
incurred on appeal. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-18 (1988) enables a court to award 
attorney fees to the successful party in a 
case brought to enforce a mechanic's lien. 
Cases interpreting that statute have con-
strued it narrowly; however, the complaint 
in this case makes clear that this is a suit 
"to enforce a lien,"6 because it seeks not 
merely a priority determination but also an 
order of foreclosure and a sheriff's sale 
under the lien. Deseret Federal is there-
fore awarded attorney fees reasonable in 
amount for services rendered in the appeal 
of this case. 
The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed, and the case reasonably is re-
manded for determination of the amount of 
attorney fees reasonably incurred on ap-
peal. 
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ., 
concur. 
LOGAN CITY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Ralph Lowell HUBER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890093-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 17, 1^90. 
Defendant was convicted, in the First 
Circuit Court, Cache County, Burton H. 
5. Duckett, 699 P.2d at 736; Boise Cascade Corp. 
v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977). 
Harris, J., of disorderly conduct and he 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, 
J., held that disorderly conduct statute pro-
scribing obscene or abusive language spo-
ken with intent "to cause public inconven-
ience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly 
creating a risk thereof" was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. 
Reversed. 
1. Municipal Corporations <$=>594(2) 
Municipal disorderly conduct ordinance 
proscribing obscene or abusive language 
spoken with intent "to cause public incon-
venience, annoyance, or alarm, or reckless-
ly creating a risk thereof" was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad, insofar as it punished a 
significant amount of protected verbal ex-
pression, including criticism and challenge, 
vulgarities and remonstrations, whether it 
was directed at police officer, ordinary citi-
zen, or one who was not even present, 
without regard to its likely impact on any 
actual addressee. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
1. 
2. Municipal Corporations <s=>594(2) 
Court would not construe the term 
"abusive language" in unconstitutionally 
overbroad disorderly conduct ordinance to 
encompass only fighting words; it was mu-
nicipality's job, not court's, to fashion nar-
rowly drawn ordinance criminalizing unpro-
tected speech. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1. 
A.W. Lauritzen, Logan City, for defen-
dant and appellant. 
Cheryl A. Russell, Logan City, for plain-
tiff-respondent. 




Ralph Lowell Huber was convicted by a 
jury of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, 
6. See Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 
App.1988). 
in violation of a Logan City ordinance. On 
appeal, he challenges the constitutionality 
of the ordinance on its face and as applied. 
We reverse. 
In the early morning hours of December 
11, 1988, Officers Russell Roper and Greg 
Monroe were on alcohol enforcement detail. 
They were parked off the road in their 
unmarked patrol car when they heard and 
saw a small car approaching them. The 
car made a wide turn at the corner and 
started to slide on the pea gravel in the 
road. The car accelerated and went past 
the police vehicle, at a speed estimated by 
the officers at 35-38 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. 
zone, then braked to a stop at a red light on 
Main Street and Third North in Logan City, 
Utah. Officer Roper followed and pulled 
up behind the car at the light. 
When the semaphore turned green and 
the small car proceeded through the inter-
section, Officer Roper turned on his red 
spotlight and followed the small car as it 
turned in to the parking lot of defendant 
Huber's business. As the officers alighted, 
Huber got out of his car and walked brisk-
ly up to the door of his building. Officer 
Monroe called to Huber and said they 
wanted to talk to him. In an exchange of 
words lasting approximately two to three 
minutes, Roper first asked Huber how he 
was, and Huber turned to face the officers, 
who were three to four feet away. He told 
the police they were trespassing on his 
property, took a step closer and said, "Now 
git," and pointed in the direction they 
should go. Roper then asked Huber for his 
driver's license. Huber refused, saying, 
"Fuck you, I'm not going to give it to you." 
The request was repeated several times 
and Huber continued to refuse, variously 
responding, "Fuck you," "This is bullshit," 
"You know who I am," and "You guys are 
harassing me, you piss me right off." Dur-
ing this time, Huber's voice was raised, he 
1. Monroe estimated the total elapsed time from 
the point at which the officers pulled in behind 
Huber's car in the business parking lot and the 
point at which he was arrested at approximately 
five to six minutes. 
LOGAN CITY v. HUBER 
Cite as 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah App 1990) 
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was using unspecified "hand actions," and 
he stepped closer to Roper, talking directly 
in his face. After Roper again explained to 
Huber that they had observed him speed-
ing, Monroe took over the conversation. 
Although Monroe testified that he inter-
vened because he thought there was going 
to be a fight, he testified to no acts other 
than the use of these words in a loud voice 
and Huber's proximity to Roper at this 
point. Roper explained that, once his part-
ner stepped in and took over the conversa-
tion with Huber, he simply backed away 
and returned to the patrol car to summon 
assistance. He then rejoined Monroe at 
the front of Huber's car at some point 
after Huber had turned over his driver's 
license to Monroe. 
The following two- to three-minute ex-
change took place next between Monroe 
and Huber, immediately preceding Huber's 
arrest,1 as captured on Monroe's tape re-
corder (all ellipses appear in the transcript 
admitted into evidence): 
Huber: . . . You're two blocks down the 
road. 
Monroe: We weren't two blocks down 
the road. 
Huber: You were clear the hell down by 
Taco Time. 
Monroe: Do you want to know where we 
really were? When you came around the 
corner, when you came around the cor-
ner awfully fast, right at the road here, 
we were parked just off the road. But 
we do need to see your driver's license. 
Huber: . . . This is my property and 
you're on it without my permission, and 
that's it that's what it boils down to. If 
it I'm tired of being harrassed. 
Monroe: We need to see your registra-
tion too please.12! 
Huber: Bullshit! Now look you're on 
my property this is my building, I ha-
2. At trial, Monroe clarified that Huber had 
turned over his driver's license at this point, 
even though the officer's next line in the record-
ed conversation makes it seem that Huber had 
not yet done so. 
U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 96 L Ed 2d 
intermediate gang minimum status. 
App 147. This change was designed 
to redress problems that had arisen 
when inmates were transferred di-
rectly from the restrictive maximum 
security status to full minimum sta-
tus, with its markedly higher level 
of freedom. Because of serious over-
crowding in the main building, Stan-
dard 853 further mandated that 
gang minimum inmates ordinarily 
be assigned jobs outside the main 
building. Ibid. These inmates work 
in details of 8 to 15 persons, super-
vised by one guard. 
[482 US 346] 
Standard 853 
also required that full minimum in-
mates work outside the main institu-
tion, whether on or off prison 
grounds, or in a satellite building 
such as the Farm. Ibid. 
Corrections officials at Leesburg 
implemented these policies gradu-
ally and, as the District Court noted, 
with some difficulty. 595 F Supp 928, 
929 (NJ 1984). In the initial stages of 
outside work details for gang mini-
mum prisoners, officials apparently 
allowed some Muslim inmates to 
work inside the main building on 
Fridays so that they could attend 
Jumu'ah. This alternative was even-
tually eliminated in March 1984, in 
light of the directive of Standard 853 
that all gang minimum inmates 
work outside the main building. 
Significant problems arose with 
those inmates assigned to outside 
work details. Some avoided reporting 
for their assignments, while others 
found reasons for returning to the 
main building during the course of 
the workday (including their desire 
to attend religious services). Evi-
dence showed that the return of 
prisoners during the day resulted in 
security risks and administrative 
burdens that prison officials found 
unacceptable. Because details of in-
mates were supervised by only one 
guard, the whole detail was forced to 
return to the main gate when one 
prisoner desired to return to the 
facility. The gate was the site of all 
incoming foot and vehicle traffic dur-
ing the day, and prison officials 
viewed it as a high security risk 
area. When an inmate returned, ve-
hicle traffic was delayed while the 
inmate was logged in and searched. 
In response to these burdens, Lees-
burg officials took steps to ensure 
that those assigned to outside details 
remained there for the whole day. 
Thus, arrangements were made to 
have lunch and required medications 
brought out to the prisoners, and 
appointments with doctors and so-
cial workers were scheduled for the 
late afternoon. These changes 
proved insufficient, however, and 
prison officials began to study alter-
natives. After consulting with the 
director of social services, the direc-
tor of professional services, and the 
1482 US 347] 
prison's imam and chaplain, prison 
officials in March 1984 issued a pol-
icy memorandum which prohibited 
inmates assigned to outside work 
details from returning to the prison 
during the day except in the case of 
emergency. 
The prohibition of returns pre-
vented Muslims assigned to outside 
work details from attending Ju-
mu'ah. Respondents filed suit under 
42 USC §1983 [42 USCS §1983], 
alleging that the prison policies un-
constitutionally denied them their 
Free Exercise rights under the First 
Amendment, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The District Court, applying 
the standards announced in an ear-
lier decision of the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit, concluded that 
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al court rejected the request that it instruct 
on negligent homicide.6 
f6] In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 
154-59 (Utah 1983), we set out a two-
pronged test for determining when lesser 
included offense instructions must be giv-
en. As applied to this case, the Baker test 
would require a showing that (i) the statu-
tory elements of the two offenses are relat-
ed, and (ii) the evidence provides a reason-
able basis for a finding of not guilty of 
second degree murder and guilty of negli-
gent homicide. We conclude that even if it 
was error for the trial court not to instruct 
the jury on negligent homicide, a question 
we do not decide, the error was harmless. 
The jury had the opportunity to find that 
Gotschall acted with a lesser mental state 
than that required for second degree mur-
der when it was given a manslaughter in-
struction, yet it convicted Gotschall of sec-
ond degree murder. Gotschall's counsel 
does not suggest how, in light of this fact, 
there is any reasonable likelihood that if an 
instruction on negligent homicide had been 
given, the jury would have convicted Gotsc-
hall of that offense, rather than second 
degree murder or manslaughter. There-
fore, the failure to give the instructions 
was harmless error. Utah R.Evid. 103; 
Utah R.Crim.P. 30 (codified at Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 77-35-30 (1982) (repealed effective 
July 1. 1990); see State v. Rimmasch, 775 
P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989); State v. Knight 
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); Verde, 
770 P.2d at 120. 
For the foregoing reasons, Gotschall's 
conviction is affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE. Associate C.J., 
DURHAM, J., and BILLINGS, Court 
of Appeals Judge, concur. 
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp.1989). 
6. Section 75-5-206 of the Code provides as fol-
lows: 
Negligent homicide. 
STEWART, J., does not participate 
herein; BILLINGS, Court of Appeals 
Judge, sat. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY. 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jill M. PAYNE and Terry J. 
Stephenson, Defendants and 
Appellant. 
No. 860268. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 16, 1989. 
Payee brought suit against secretary 
who signed checks drawn on insufficient 
funds. The Third District Court. Salt Lake 
County, Scott Daniels, J., held secretary 
liable, and she appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that signator of 
bad check could not be held personally lia-
ble where she did not receive benefits or 
have actual knowledge that check was 
drawn on insufficient funds. 
Reversed. 
Howe, J., concurred in result. 
1. Bills and Notes e=> 123(2) 
Signator of bad check could not be held 
personally liable where she did not receive 
benefits, services, or money transfers, or 
have actual knowledge that check she 
signed in her capacity as secretary/book-
keeper was drawn on insufficient corporate 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent 
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal 
negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misde-
meanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (1978). 
MOUNTAIN STATES TE1 
Cite as 782 P2d 
funds. U.C.A.1953, 7-15-1, 70A-1-104, 
70A-3-403, 70A-3-403(2)(b). 
2. Constitutional Law <3=»48(1) 
If there are alternative statutory con-
structions possible, one rendering statute 
constitutional and the other unconstitution-
al, the former should be adopted. U.C.A. 
1953, 7-15-1, 70A-1-104, 70A-3-403, 70A-
3-403(2)(b). 
James F. Housley, Salt Lake City, for 
Payne. 
Floyd A. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for 
Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Appellant Jill M. Payne contends that the 
trial court committed reversible error in 
finding her liable for writing checks drawn 
on insufficient funds pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (1988).1 We reverse. 
Appellant was employed as a secre-
tary/bookkeeper for NAMCO Corporation 
from 1981 to 1982. As part of her as-
signed duties, appellant, an authorized sig-
natory, prepared and signed checks drawn 
upon the corporate accounts in payment of 
corporate obligations at the direction of 
corporate officers. She had no interest, 
beneficial or otherwise, in the checking ac-
count, the funds in the checking account, or 
the corporation. 
A number of checks written to Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Co. (Moun-
tain States) for services received by NAM-
CO and signed by appellant were drawn on 
insufficient funds. As a result. Mountain 
States brought suit against appellant and 
her boss, defendant Terry J. Stephenson, 
for liability under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7-15-1. Both defendants were properly 
served. Stephenson failed to appear or 
answer, and judgment by default was en-
tered against him on December 9, 1982. 
Appellant wrote a timely letter to plain-
tiffs counsel, referring to the summons 
and explaining that she was a mere em-
ployee and had signed the checks at Ste-
phenson's direction. No further action was 
L & TEL. CO. v. PAYNE Utah 4 6 5 
4*4 (Utah 1989) 
taken regarding the claim against appellant 
until approximately thirty-nine months la-
ter, when Mountain States filed a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or, in the 
alternative, for summary judgment, con-
tending that appellant answered the com-
plaint but did not deny liability for the 
debt. The trial court entered an order 
granting plaintiffs motion for judgment 
after a hearing in which appellant appeared 
pro se. Judgment for $2,896.76 was en-
tered on April 8, 1986. 
Appellant thereafter arranged for pro 
bono counsel. Appellant's attorney filed 
alternative motions for relief from order, 
amendment of judgment, new trial, judg-
ment n.o.v., and findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. After a hearing on appel-
lant's alternative motions, the trial judge 
denied them, concluding that Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-15-1 imposed strict liability on 
appellant. The trial judge subsequently 
signed an order granting plaintiffs motion 
for judgment on the pleadings. The trial 
judge declined to enter findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. 
Appellant argues that the trial court 
committed reversible error in construing 
section 7-15-1 as imposing strict liability 
on her for signing corporate checks on 
behalf of her employer in payment for cor-
porate obligations. Appellant also argues 
that construing section 7-15-1 to impose 
strict liability renders the statute unconsti-
tutional under the due process provision of 
the fourteenth amendment of the United 
States Constitution and article I, section 7 
of the Utah Constitution. We address the 
strict liability issue first. 
The statute at issue. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7-15-1 (1988), states in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who makes, draws, 
signs or issues any check, draft, order or 
other instrument upon any depository in-
stitution, whether as corporate agent or 
otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining 
from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation any money, merchandise, 
property, or other thing of value or pay-
ing for any service, wages, salary or 
rent, shall be liable to the holder of the 
1. The current version of the statute reflects mi- nor grammatical changes made in 1986. 
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always been an integral element in Colora 
do's bad check law The reason for chang 
ing this intent to a reasonable cause to 
know that the check will not be paid when 
presented for payment is obscure Surmise 
and conjecture would lead us to the view 
that the apparent intent of the General As 
sembly was to enable the district attorneys 
to facilitate prosecutions and obtain con-
victions more readily in bad check cases 
We might also suspect that the present 
statute was designed to facilitate collec-
tions on both bad checks and debts We 
were told on oral argument by the district 
attorney that the gravamen of the statute 
is to prevent worthless paper from enter-
ing the flow of commercial transactions, 
the resulting effect being to increase the 
reliability of commercial paper It is also 
possible that the new law was aimed at 
some sort of conformity with the provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code 
with respect to practices of banks and 
banking 
Whatever reasons prompted the enact-
ment of the present bad check statute, we 
are compelled to state that it is utterly 
lacking in the essential elements which as-
cribe validity and legal sufficiency to any 
enforceable criminal statute It is of sig-
nificance to note also that we have not 
been directed to any bad check statute of 
any other state, nor have we been able to 
discover any jurisdiction which has a stat-
ute similar to the Colorado statute 
The trial court found the statute uncon-
stitutional and void because of vagueness, 
uncertainty, indefiniteness, ambiguity, and 
unintelligibihty It also found that, in 
some instances, the statute presumes guilt, 
that, in some instances, it is selective in 
prosecution, that the bank involved has 
the power to decide whether a party is a 
criminal or a favored customer, and final-
ly, that the statute is a collection statute 
and imposes imprisonment for debt We 
agree with the trial court that these in-
f i rmi ty are oresent in this statute. 
With these general observations in mind, 
we turn to an examination of the particu-
lar deficiencies in this statute 
II 
[1,2] The district attorney on behalf of 
the People asserts that it was error for the 
trial court to hold the entire statute uncon-
stitutional, and argues that even if certain 
portions of the Act are unconstitutional, 
the general severability clause of C R S 
1963, 135-1-5 would save the rest of the 
statute The trial judge ruled that since 
the enacting clause did not contain a sever-
ability section, the entire Act must fall. 
We agree with the district attorney that 
C R S 1963, 135-1-5 would save those por-
tions of the Act not found to be unconsti-
tutional as this general severability clause 
is applicable to any legislative act not con-
taining a specific severability provision 
However, the final portion of C R S 1963, 
135-1-5 declares, in effect, that if those 
unexcised portions of an Act are incom-
plete and are incapable of being executed 
in accordance with the legislative intent, 
the entire Act is void As will be noted 
hereinafter, the skeleton of Section 40-
14-20 which remains after striking out the 
invalid provisions, fails to describe any of-
fense Therefore, the trial court properly 
declared the entire statute unconstitutional 
III 
[3,4] We hold that the definition of 
"insufficient funds" in Section 40-14-20(1) 
(h) is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible 
That section defines insufficient funds to 
mean "that the drawer has no legal right 
to require the drawee to pay the check in 
accordance with the ordinary course of the 
banking business " An interesting contrast 
to this definition is that contained in the 
amended version of the vetoed 1969 H B 
1087 which defined "insufficient funds" as 
follows 
"A drawer has insufficient funds with a 
drawee to cover a check when he has no 
funds or account whatever, or funds in 
PEOPLE v 
Cite as Colo 
an amount less than that of the check, 
and a check dishonored for 'no account' 
shall also be deemed to have been dis 
honored for 'insufficient funds ' " 
The above quoted definition spells out an 
understandable meaning of "insufficient 
funds" while the 1970 Act leaves the mean 
ing to surmise and conjecture Criminal 
liability cannot be predicated on such a 
standard What is meant by "legal 
right?" Does it refer to legal rights as 
determined by the provisions of Article 4 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, C R S 
1963, 155-4-101 et seq?, does it mean 
contractual rights between the drawer and 
the drawee? , or, does it refer to legal 
rights created by the provisions of the 
criminal law? Also, where does one look 
to determine what accords with "the ordi-
nary course of the banking business?" Is 
it to the Uniform Commercial Code, to 
some other statute, or to the customs and 
practices of the banking business itself? 
This failure of the definition to clearly de 
lineate an understandable meaning to the 
term "insufficient funds," renders this por-
tion of the statute invalid as being vague, 
indefinite, ambiguous, and unintelligible 
IV 
[5,6] Next, we find that the lack of 
any requirement in Section 40-14-20 that 
there be an intent to defraud coupled with 
a presumption of guilt provided in Subdivi-
sion (5) (a) (i) woulvl, under certain cir 
cumstances, render Section 40-14-20 to be 
no more than a device to force payment of 
debt It is quite conceivable that a person 
could issue a check without "knowing or 
having reasonable cause to know" that it 
will not be paid when presented as re-
quired in Subdivision (2) (b) Thereafter, 
if the check is for some reason not paid 
when presented, and if the maker is unable 
to redeem his check within fifteen days (see 
Subdivision (6) (b)), a presumption arises 
which shifts the burden on to the defend 
ant to disprove his guilt Such a result 
strikes at the very foundation of our sys-
*-.- ~r „, ^ „Qi ,iictir#» a* was recognized 
VINNOLA Colo 8 3 1 
404 P 2d 826 
by this court in Moore v People, supra It 
is elementary that the burden of proving 
every element of a criminal charge is upon 
the prosecution Under Section 40-14-20, 
the People need only introduce the check, 
show it was not paid, and rest The de-
fendant is then placed in a position of 
being required to prove his innocence in 
order to avoid imprisonment not for a 
criminal act, but for debt This is so be-
cause without fraudulent intent as an ele-
ment in this type of offense, there can be 
no crime In this respect, Section 40-14-
20 can be interpreted as nothing more than 
a collection statute which authorizes im-
prisonment for debt As such, it is in con-
travention of Colo Const art II, § 12 
See, also Burnam v Commonwealth, 228 
Ky 410, 15 S W 2 d 256, which uses the 
following language to describe a statute 
which was, in some respects, similar in 
content to Section 40-14-20 
"The act is a debt collecting law 
To that end it undertakes to invoke 
criminal processes and to inflict penalties 
which in their seventy may be on occa-
sion disproportionate to the seriousness 
of the offense endeavored to be created 
and the evil sought to be cured The es-
sential and controlling difference be-
tween the act and other statutes of this 
kind, . is that the element of 
fraud or other criminal purpose is not an 
ingredient" 
[7] In addition, under the various pro-
visions of Section 40-14-20, the action of a 
third party, the bank, can often be the fac-
tor which determines whether guilt at-
taches If two customers each write a 
check knowing it will not be paid on 
presentment due to insufficiency of funds 
in their respective accounts, each should be 
theoretically guilty of a crime Yet, the 
bank upon which the check is drawn has 
the discretion to dishonor one and pay the 
other Such a discretion is at odds with 
constitutional due process and equal protec-
tion of the laws Criminal liability and 
punishments should not be predicated upon 
a third party's unfettered discretion 
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tracted for the construction of an apart-
ment complex in Salt Lake County. BBC 
subcontracted the plumbing work to Hor-
ace Lloyd, who purchased plumbing materi-
als from PPS commencing in June 1983 to 
August 1984. Lloyd failed to pay PPS for 
all of the materials furnished for the con-
struction project. 
On December 31, 1984, Bowers sold the 
project to Regency Apartments, Ltd. (Re-
gency). Bernson, Terry, and Babcock were 
general partners in Vescor Financial 
Group, which was the general partner of 
Regency. Bernson was the only limited 
partner in Regency. 
On the same day that Regency pur-
chased the project from Bowers, it sold the 
project to Wilshire Utah I Ltd., which 
failed to make payments to the first mort-
gage holder, American Savings and Loan, 
as well as to Bowers and Regency. Wil-
shire eventually filed for bankruptcy and 
American Savings foreclosed on the proper-
ty. 
Regency then entered into an arrange-
ment with Bowers whereby Regency would 
negotiate a settlement with the ten credi-
tors of the project, including PPS, for 
which Regency would receive credit 
against the sum it owed to Bowers equal to 
the full amount due each creditor. All of 
the creditors except PPS negotiated a set-
tlement with Regency. 
PPS received a check from Regency dat-
ed May 15, 1985, in the amount of $13,750, 
an arbitrary figure offered by Regency to 
settle PPS's claim of approximately $19,-
000. The check contained a restrictive en-
dorsement that PPS, by endorsing the 
check, would be releasing any and all 
claims it might have against Bowers 
and/or the property. The endorsement 
stated: 
Endorsement hereby releases any claims 
for further payments of any and all out-
standing Invoices to either Bowers Con-
struction, Eugene Bowers, Vescor Finan-
cial Group or any future assignee. In 
consideration of this payment Peterson 
Plumbing Supply and/or Don Peterson 
agree that all payments concerning bills 
for supplies and/or work done on the 
Regency Apartments . . . is paid in full 
accordance [sic] satisfaction. Endorse^  
ment also constitutes a full and complete, 
waiver of any and all lien rights as pert 
taining to the above mentioned proper-
ties and parties. 
After receiving the check, Don Peterson, 
PPS's owner, told Bernson and Babcock im 
separate telephone calls that PPS was xum 
willing to accept the amount offered by the 
check. Peterson asked for more money, 
but was told that no more would be of. 
fered. A week later, Bernson again dis* 
cussed the matter with Peterson, who 
again rejected the offer. Bernson then 
told Peterson that the offer was withdrawn 
and asked Peterson to return the cheeky 
Peterson failed to return the check. Funds 
in the account upon which the check was 
drawn were subsequently transferred to 
another account 
Six weeks later, PPS deposited the check. 
The check did not clear when presented to 
the bank for payment Subsequently, PPS 
brought suit against appellees and Bowers. 
The trial court entered judgment on a 
quantum meruit theory against Bowers for 
$5,246, a sum calculated by adding the 
invoices produced at trial and deducting 
certain credits. The trial court, however, 
granted a directed verdict in favor of appel-
lees dismissing PPS's action against them 
based on a third party beneficiary theory 
and on their alleged civil liability under 
Utah's bad check statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 7-15-1 (1982). PPS appeals the trial 
court's directed verdict in favor of appel-
lees on the bad check issue only. 
[1] On appeal, PPS claims the trial 
court erred in determining that the $13,750 
check was not given for value under sec-
tion 7-15-1. On review, we accord the trial 
court's conclusions of law no particular def-
erence, but review them for correctness. 
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 
(Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 
409 (Utah CtApp.1990). 
Section 7-15-1 states in pertinent part 
(with our emphasis): 
(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs 
or issues any check, draft, order, or other 
instrument upon any depository institu-
PETERSON PLUMBING 
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tion, whether as corporate agent or oth-
erwise, for the purpose of obtaining 
from any person, firm, partnership or 
corporation any money, merchandise, 
property or other thing of value or pay-
ing for any service, wages, salary or 
rent, which check, draft, order, or other 
instrument is not honored upon present-
ment and is marked "refer to maker" or 
the account with the depository upon 
which the check, draft, order, or other 
instrument has been made or drawn, 
does not exist, has been closed or does 
not have sufficient funds or sufficient 
credit with such depository for payment 
of the check, draft, or other instrument 
in full, shall be liable to the holder there-
of. 
Tie Utah Supreme Court recently con-
strued section 7-15-1 "to require that the 
signator of a bad check personally receive 
Benefits, services, or money transfer or, in 
the alternative, have actual knowledge that 
the check is drawn on insufficient funds in 
Drder to be held liable." Mountain States 
Tel & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 467 
(Utah 1989). 
[2] The trial court found that nothing 
of value had been obtained by Regency 
from PPS in exchange for the presentment 
of the check. No goods were obtained 
from PPS in exchange for the check; the 
items of value, the plumbing materials, 
were supplied earlier, on behalf of and at 
the request of Bowers. 
We reject PPS's contention that the trial 
court erred in finding that the check was 
not given for value under section 7-15-1. 
Pivotal to our analysis is the fact that PPS 
flatly rejected appellees' offer to enter into 
an accord and satisfaction. PPS's belated 
attempt to negotiate the check six weeks 
after it had rejected Regency's offer and 
subsequent withdrawal of the offer did not 
constitute an acceptance. Having rejected 
an offer, an offeree cannot revive it by 
later tendering acceptance. Burton v. 
Coombs, 557 P.2d 148, 149 (Utah 1976). 
SUPPLY v. BERNSON Utah 475 
1 (Utah App 1990) 
PPS first argues that the check consti-
tuted payment for an antecedent debt and 
that the trial court mistakenly applied the 
criminal bad check statute's alleged man-
date that a check issued for payment of an 
antecedent debt is not a "thing of value." ! 
PPS contends that section 7-15-1 should 
instead be read in light of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 70A-3-303 and -403 (1980) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, to support its posi-
tion that a negotiable instrument is given 
for value when given for payment of an 
antecedent obligation. 
We agree that where possible, section 
7-15-1 should be construed to be consistent 
with the Uniform Commercial Code. See 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 782 P.2d 
at 467. In this case, however, we need not 
determine whether the payment of an ante-
cedent debt qualifies as a "thing of value" 
under section 7-15-1 since, because PPS 
rejected appellees' offer to enter into an 
accord and satisfaction, the debt was never 
satisfied. Further, PPS does not dispute 
the trial court's finding that no other de-
fendant, besides Bowers, contracted to pay 
outstanding obligations of Bowers to mate-
rialmen on the project. Thus, even if the 
debt were satisfied, since the debt was 
Bowers', Regency would not have received 
anything of value solely as a result of the 
debt's satisfaction. 
PPS next contends that the check was 
given "for value" under section 7-15-1 in 
that it purchased credit towards the con-
tract between Regency and Bowers. 
Again, we disagree. Because PPS rejected 
appellees' offer, Regency did not obtain 
any credit towards their contract with Bow-
ers and thus did not receive anything of 
value nor any benefit. 
Finally, PPS asserts that the check was 
given "for value" to release a potential 
lien. However, because PPS failed to file a 
lien within eighty days of supplying its last 
materials in August 1984, it had no me-
chanic's lien rights to relinquish in May 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1990). PPS does 
not provide any meaningful explanation for the 
hypothesized mandate. 
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SUMMARY 
The appellee, who wore a small cloth version of the United States Hag 
sewn on the seat of his trousers, was convicted under a Massachusetts 
s ta tu te which imposed criminal liability on anyone who publicly " t rea ts 
contemptuously" the United States flag. Following the affirmance of his 
conviction by the IVlashachusetIs Supreme Judicial Court ( Mass —, 
279 NE2d ()(i(i), the appellee was ordered released on a writ of habeas 
corpus by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
on the ground that the contempt portion of the Massachusetts statute was 
impermissibly vague under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First Amendment (343 F 
Supp 161). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed (471 
F2d 88) . 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. In an opinion 
by POWELL, J., expressing the view of tive members of the court, it was 
held that the " t reats contemptuously" portion of the statute was void for 
vagueness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the statutory provision did not adequately give notice of what 
acts were criminal and did not set reasonable s tandards to guide law en-
forcement officers and juries. 
W H I T E , J., concurring in the judgment, expressed the view that 
although (he portion of the statute at issue was not unconstitutionally 
vague, it was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. 
BLACKMUN, J., |oined by BuiujLR, Ch. J., dissenting, expressed the view 
that the challenged part of the statute was neither unconstitutionally vague 
nor was if violative* of the First Amendment since the Supreme Judicial 
Uriels of Counsel, p I02<>, infra. 
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sustain the denial of an award under the 
accepted rule that affirmance will follow 
such denial under such circumstances. The 
rule is reflected in the several pronounce-
ments of this Court in such cases as Mar-
tinez v. Board of Review, 25 Utah 2d 131, 
477 P.2d 587 (1970), and decisions therein 
cited. 
The decision of the commission is af-
firmed. 
( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Michael Alfonso DELMOTTE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 18457. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 14, 1983. 
Defendant was convicted before the 
Third District Court, Summit County, Ho-
mer F. Wilkinson, J., of writing bad checks, 
and he appealed. The Supreme Court held 
that: (1) issue of refusal to give requested 
instruction was not preserved for review; 
(2) record justified admission of bank state-
ments showing overdrafts, which were sent 
to defendant, to show commission ot of-
fense charged, and probative effect of such 
evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect; 
and (3) intent to defraud was not element 
of bad-check charge. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
1. False Pretenses «=>5 
"Knowledge" of account's depletion is 
material element in offense of writing bad 
checks. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-505. 
2. Criminal Law «==> 1038.2, 1038.3 
Where, in prosecution for writing bad 
checks, defendant made no objection, nor 
did he except to refusal to give requested 
instruction, issue was not before Supreme 
Court on appeal. U.C.A.1953, 7&-6-505. 
3. Criminal Law e=*432 
Monthly bank statements showing 
overdrafts, which were sent to defendant, 
were admissible in prosecution for writing 
bad checks to show "knowledge" of over-
drafts, as integral and material part of of-
fense charged. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-505; 
Rules of Evid., Rules 45, 55. 
4. Criminal Law e=»432 
In prosecution for writing bad checks, 
record justified admission of monthly bank 
statements showing overdrafts, which were 
sent to defendant, to show commission of 
offense charged, and probative effect out-
weighed any prejudicial effect. U.C.A 
1953, 76-6-505; Rules of Evid., Rules 45, 
55. 
5. False Pretenses <3=» 5 
Intent to defraud is not element of 
offense of writing bad checks. 
6. False Pretenses o=»5 
Element of "knowledge" of overdraft is 
sufficient to support conviction of writing 
bad checks. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-505. 
Kenneth R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Robert N. 
Parrish. Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
PER CURIAM; 
This is an appeal from jury convictions 
for writing bad checks in violation of 
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-505. The subject 
checks (three in number) were issued and 
dishonored between August and November, 
1980. The defendant, a landscaper in Parte 
City, was placed on probation after having 
been sentenced to the indeterminate term 
provided by law. 
The jury heard the following facts in 
support of the verdict. From the latte* 
months in 1978 through the early montfti w 
1981, defendant had a checking a d f l w 
with First Security Bank. He was told pfm. 
STATE v. DELMOTTE 
Cite as 665 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983) 
Utah 1315 
bank official that the bank would not con-
tinue to honor his bad checks. Defendant 
was otherwise made aware of his overdrafts 
by his receipt of monthly statements, which 
were admitted in evidence over objection. 
The defendant admitted writing the checks, 
but testified he believed he had sufficient 
funds in his account to cover them. He 
claimed that at the time of the last and 
largest check he is charged with writing 
without sufficient funds, he had a third 
person's check in his possession, which he 
intended to deposit. The reason he did not 
deposit the check was because he learned it 
also would not be honored. Defendant con-
ceded receiving the monthly statements 
showing the overdraft status of his bank 
account, and admitted that he knew he was 
overdrawn at the time he wrote the third 
check, with which he was charged in the 
information. His testimony with respect to 
that check was self-contradictory. 
[1,2] On appeal, defendant urges that 
the trial court erred in refusing to give his 
requested instruction No. 10. He contends 
that one's belief that he has sufficient 
funds in the bank is a defense to the 
charge, and that he was entitled to have his 
theory of the case presented to the jury.1 
"Knowledge" of the account's depletion is a 
material element in the offense charged. 
At trial, defendant admitted that he knew 
his account was overdrawn when he issued 
the third check. In any event, the defend-
ant made no objection nor did he except :o 
the court's refusal to give the instruction. 
and consequently the issue is not now be-
fore us.2 
[3] Defendant next contends that the 
court abused its discretion in admitting the 
monthly bank statements sent to defendant 
showing overdrafts. Defendant asserts 
such abuse of discretion under Rules 45 and 
55, Utah Rules of Evidence. Under Rule 
55, the bank statements are admissible to 
show "knowledge" of the overdrafts, an 
integral and material part of the offense 
charged. The trial court substantially so 
1. State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 
(1970). 
2. State v. Valdez, Utah, 604 P.2d 472 (1979); 
State v. Pierren, Utah, 583 P.2d 69 (1978). 
instructed the jury in instruction No. 5, as 
being the reason for such admission in evi-
dence. This Court, in a recent case, disposi-
tively affirmed such admissibility in a ease 
like this,3 when it quoted the following lan-
guage; 
Any pertinent fact which throws light 
upon . . . the accused's guilt or innocence 
of the crime . . . charged, is admissible. 
Such fact is not to be excluded merely 
because it may also prove or tend to 
prove . . . another similar crime. Rele-
vant and material evidence does not be-
come irrelevant or immaterial merely be-
cause it points to other offenses. 
[4] We believe and hold that the record 
justified admission of the bank statements 
under Rule 55, to show commission of the 
offense charged, and under Rule 45 because 
the probative effect of such evidence out-
weighed any prejudicial effect. 
[5,6] Defendant's final contention is 
that the court erred in failing to instruct 
that intent to defraud is a necessary ele-
ment of a bad check charge. This claim of 
error is without merit, since the offense 
calls for no such element. Defendant ar-
gues that when the statutory language was 
changed in 1977, the legislature intended to 
retain the element as part of the offense. 
The omission of the element in the revised 
statute logically can mean nothing but that 
the legislature's purpose deliberately was to 
remove such intent as an element of the 
offense. The element of "'knowledge" of 
the overdraft is now sufficient to support a 
conviction. 
The verdicts and judgment are dffirmed. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
3. State v. Forsyth. Utah, 641 P.2d 1172 (1982). 
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hearing the case and addressing more fully 
an issue of first impression Upon recon 
sideration, we vacate our previous opinion 
and set aside the trial court s judgment of 
conviction and remand 
Defendant was convicted of the crime of 
unlawful sexual intercourse, a third degree 
felony, under UCA, 1953, §76-5-401, 
which provided ! 
(1) A person commits unlawful sexual 
intercourse if that person has sexual in 
tercourse with a person, not that per 
son's spouse, who is under sixteen years 
of age 
(2) Unlawful sexual intercourse is a 
felony of the third degree except when at 
the time of intercourse the actor is no 
more than three years older than the 
victim, m which ease it is a class B misde 
meanor Evidence that the actor was not 
more than three years older than the 
victim at the time of the intercourse shall 
be raised by the defendant 
On September 16, 1981, defendant en-
gaged in sexual intercourse with a girl, not 
his wife, who was fourteen jears of age 
Defendant was nineteen years of age at the 
time and therefore more than three years 
older than the girl Defendant testified 
that the girl told him she was eightteen 
years of age and that he believed her repre 
sentation The girl testified that she par-
ticipated m the act voluntarily, but that she 
told the defendant that she was fifteen 
years old Although the trial court allowed 
testimony showing that the defendant 
knew the girl's age, the trial court excluded 
any further testimony by the defendant 
concerning the reasonableness of his belief 
as to the girl's age and instructed the jury 
that mistake as to the girl's age was no 
defense to the charge 
On this appeal, defendant argues that 
the trial court erred m (1) excluding the 
proffered evidence substantiating the basis 
of the defendant's alleged belief that the 
girl was over the a^ ge of sixteen years and 
1 The section has since been amended 1983 
Utah Laws ch 88 § 16 
(2) rejecting the defendant s requested jur\ 
instruction that a reasonable mistake as to 
the girl s age constituted a defense to the 
crime as charged We note that even if the 
requested instruction had been given and 
the jury had found in accordance therewith 
the defendant still would have been guilt} 
of fornication under Utah law UCA 
1953, § 76-7-104 
I 
[1,2] The Utah Criminal Code follows 
the common law in establishing the basic 
proposition that a person cannot be found 
guilty of a criminal offense unless he har 
bors a requisite criminal state of mind or 
unless the prohibited act is based on strict 
liability At the time in question, § 76-2-
101 stated 
No person is guilty of an offense un 
less his conduct is prohibited by law and 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly or with criminal negligence 
with respect to each element of the of 
fense as the definition of the offense 
requires, or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense in 
volving strict liability2 
Thus, for an act to constitute a crime, the 
act must be prohibited and the defendant 
must be shown to have possessed a culpa 
ble or criminal state of mind, a mens rea, 
"with respect to each element of the of 
fense," unless the offense involves a strict 
liability offense An established first pnn 
ciple of the cnmmal law, with few excep 
tions, is that the doing of a wrongful act 
without the requisite culpable mental state 
does not constitute a crime State v Blue, 
17 Utah 175, 181, 53 P 978, 980 (1898) 
Nor does the harboring of a criminal men 
tal state, not translated into a prohibited 
act constitute a crime 
[3,4] Under the Utah Criminal Code, a 
crime may be a strict liability crime only if 
the statute specifically states it to be such3 
At the time m dispute, § 76-2-102 stated 
2. The section has since been amended 1983 
Utah Laws ch 90 § 1 ch 98 § 1 
3 Strict criminal liability is clearly an exception 
STVTE v ELTON 
Cite as 680 PJd 727 (Utah 1984) 
Utah 
E\er\ offense not involving strict ha 
biht\ shall require a culpable mental 
state and when the definition of the of 
fense does not specify a culpable mental 
state intent, knowledge or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish criminal respon 
sibihty An offense shall involve strict 
liability only when a statute defining 
the offense clearly indicates a legisla 
tive purpose to impose strict liability 
for the conduct by use of the phrase 
4istnct liability" or other terms of stmt 
lar import [Emphasis added ] * 
The unlawful sexual intercourse statute, 
§ 76-5-401, supra, does not clearly indi 
cate "a legislative purpose to impose strict 
liability" as required by § 76-2-102 to es 
tabhsh a stnct liability offense It does not 
even impliedly indicate a legislative pur 
pose to impose strict liability Thus, a 
crime of unlawful sexual intercourse, a 
crime different from the cnme of fornica 
tion, cannot be proved unless the state 
proves the requisite criminal state of mind 
as to each element of the offense § 76-2-
101(1) 
The elements of the degree of unlawful 
sexual intercourse charged here are (1) an 
act of sexual intercourse, (2) with a person, 
not the defendant's spouse, (3) who is un 
der sixteen years of age The punishment 
is enhanced if the defendant is more than 
three years older than the other person 
§ 76-5-401(2) In proving unlawful sexual 
intercourse, therefore, the state must prove 
a culpable mental state bv showing that 
the defendant °act[ed] intentionally, know 
mgly, recklessly or with criminal negh 
gence," § 76-2-101(1), as those terms are 
defined m § 76-2-103 
to long-established principles of criminal habih 
ty Lnder Utah law strict liability exists onh 
when the statute defining the offense expressly 
so states. Generally strict criminal liability is 
employed only in certain business or economic 
regulations The United States Supreme Court 
discussed the subject of strict liability in Moris 
sette v United States 342 U S 246 72 S Ct 240 
96 LEd 288 (1952) in which a defendants 
conviction was overturned because no mens rea 
was shown and the crime was not a regulatory 
offense 
Clearh the requisite culpable m« 
state as to the first and second elemen 
the offense is established b> showing 
defendant intentionally engaged in se 
intercourse with a female not his \ 
However since the crime of unlawful s 
al intercourse is not a strict liability 
fense, the critical issue is what rm 
state must exist as to the victim's i 
On its face, the unlawful sexual u 
course statute does not require intent < 
all elements of the cnme The mens 
necessarv for the third element of 
crime requires a consideration of the 
poses of the statute No doubt one 
pose of the statute is to deter persons 1 
engaging in intercourse with young, in 
ture persons and to avoid the conseq 
risk of pregnancies because those sul 
to the prohibitions of the statute, 
males and females, are not likely tc 
fully knowledgeable in any realistic 
about the personal and social conseque 
of an out-of wedlock pregnancy The 
ute seeks to establish barriers around, 
provide a measure of protection to, yoi 
er, more impressionable, and perhaps n 
persuadable persons m order to pre 
them from engaging in sexual mtercoi 
out of wedlock 
[51 To accomplish those purposes 
still remain true to long-established fu 
mental principles of the cnminal law, w 
have been incorporated in the Utah Ci 
nal Code, we hold that as to the t 
element of the crime, there must be p 
of a culpable mental state which estab 
es that the defendant was at least cnmi 
ly negligent as to the age of the part 
That is, the prosecution must prove 
the defendant either was aware of the 
4 This section has since been amended 
Utah Laws ch 90 § 2 
5 We shall refer to the girl in this case as 
victim where helpful and for ease of r 
ence although arguably this is a so called 
timless crime Indeed both the girl and 
defendant could have been charged with vi 
ing § 76-3-401 The act prohibited is not 
but a consensual act on the part of both par 
However that may be the policy of law i 
prevent persons from engaging in mterco 
outside of marriage 
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reversal; and David Robinson, Jr., filed a brief, pro se, as amicus curiae 
urging reversal. 
Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Robert Hermann, 
Solicitor General, Lawrence S. Kahn, Howard L. Zwickel, Charles R. 
Fraser, and Sanford M. Cohen, Assistant Attorneys General, and John 
Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, filed briefs for the state of 
New York et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance; Daniel D. Levenson, 
David Cohen, and Frederick Mandel filed briefs for the American Jewish 
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